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Abstract
In the Pacific Northwest, the Columbia and Snake Rivers once supplied
habitat for one of the world's most productive salmon fisheries. The Indian
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Nations residing in the Columbia Basin harvested these abundant salmon runs to
provide for their daily nourishment, winter food supply, and their economic
livelihood. In 1855, recognizing the pressures of increasing non-Indian settlement,
these tribes ceded millions of acres of land to the United States but reserved their
primary economic resource - the salmon fisheries. Despite assurances that the
fisheries would be maintained as the tribes knew them, the United States
extensively developed the Columbia Basin and depleted the fisheries. Attempting
to compensate for the effects of the dams, the United States pursued mitigation
policies that have failed to sustain salmon populations at harvestable levels. In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has established that such treaty-
reserved resources must be maintained at economically viable levels. Moreover,
United States laws governing development in the Columbia Basin consistently
affirm the force of the 1855 treaty agreements. To restore the tribal fisheries and
comply with its 1855 treaty obligations, the United States must remove its
damaging hydropower development in the Columbia Basin. Most of the recent
studies on the biological and ecological issues of salmon recovery conclude that
dam removal is the only option that will rebuild self-sustaining salmon
populations and restore tribal fisheries to economically viable levels.
L Introduction
In the Pacific Northwest along the Columbia and Snake Rivers, the Nez Perce
Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation share an
inextricably linked existence with the great salmon runs of the region.' This
relationship was forged over thousands of years as the Tribes derived their daily
sustenance and economic livelihood from the ten million to sixteen million
salmon that returned to the Columbia Basin each year. In 1855, recognizing the
pressures of increasing non-Indian settlement, the Tribes protected and reserved
their salmon harvests in treaty with the United States. However, subsequent U.S.
dam development altered the ecology of the basin and decimated the Tribes'
fisheries.
The Columbia Basin is currently the most dammed watershed in the world
with more that 500 federal, state, and private dams. In addition to licensing each
1. Hereinafter I refer to these four tribes as "the Columbia Basin Tribes" or "the Tribes." In
developing political, legal, and ecological arguments for reviving the Tribes' salmon based
economies, this article focuses on the four Tribes signing treaties at the 1855 Walla Walla treaty
council anl possessing treaty fishing rights to Columbia Basin salmon. However, the issues
addressed here are raised by other tribes living throughout, and beyond, the Columbia Basin and
apply to many other river systems. In addition, anadromous fishes of economic value to the
Tribes include both salmon and steelhead trout; however, because the impacts of river




of these dams, the federal government's construction of large hydropower and
multipurpose dams began with the Bonneville Dam near the mouth of the
Columbia in 1938. By 1975, the United States developed a total of nine major
dams along the mainstem Columbia and lower Snake Rivers. On the upper
Columbia, one of these dams is impassable to salmon and blocks access to 1100
miles of mainstem and tributary habitat On the lower portions of the Columbia
and Snake Rivers, the reservoirs of the other eight major federal dams create
slackwater conditions from Bonneville Dam to Lewiston, Idaho. Lewiston is now
an inland seaport 471 miles inland from the Pacific Ocean.
As a result of this development eliminating or degrading nearly all Columbia
Basin salmon habitat, fifty-nine Columbia Basin salmon stocks passed into
extinction in less than a century. To remain viable, many of the remaining stocks
are dependent on hatchery production. Currently, ten Columbia Basin salmon
stocks are listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Of the salmon that
continue to return to the Basin, each must contend with some or all of the eight
federal dams on the lower Columbia and Snake Rivers. In addition to posing a
substantial impediment to up or downstream migration, these dams impose
hundreds of miles of lacustrine conditions where the rivers once ran cool and
clean. Only 150 miles of the Columbia and Snake rivers still provide free-
flowing alluvial salmon habitat: the Hanford Reach on the Columbia River and
a portion of Snake River downstream from the Hells Canyon Complex.
Promoting economic extraction of the region's resources, federal agencies
governing river development limited their treaty obligations to mitigating the
effects of the dams on the Tribes' fisheries. These federal agencies only required
tribal access to the fisheries and a tribal share of whatever salmon remain in the
rivers. Contrary to this narrow reading of U.S. treaty obligations, the 1855
treaties reserve tribal salmon harvests far above levels sustained by U.S.
mitigation policies. Tribal history and an analysis of the 1855 treaty negotiations
demonstrate that the Tribes specifically reserved the harvest of an economically
viable fishery. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recognizes this
reservation and enforced it against development that threatens the Tribes'
fisheries.
By diminishing salmon populations below economically harvestable levels,
U.S. development of the Basin violates the 1855 treaties with the Columbia Basin
Tribes. To comply with the treaties, the United States must recover salmon
stocks by removing some of the dams along the Columbia and Snake Rivers.
Contrary to the past thirty years of unsuccessful mitigation efforts offered by
federal agencies, dam removal directly addresses the environmental degradation
that threatens salmon stocks. Nearly every recent study on Columbia Basin
salmon recovery concludes that salmon populations cannot be recovered to self-
sustaining levels without breaching some of the major federal dams on the
Columbia and Snake rivers. As the evidence supporting dam removal continues
to build, regional politicians have dug in their heels against removing U.S.
development. However, if the United States is to comply with its legal
No. 2]
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obligations to the Columbia Basin Tribes, the fisheries must be recovered to
economically viable levels as was ratified by the 1855 treaties.
Figure 1. Map of Columbia Basin Tribes, dams, and primary rivers
2. WY-KAN-USH-MI WA-KISH-Wrr (SPIRrr OF THE SALMON), THE COLUMBIA RIVER
ANADROMOUS FISH RESTORATION PLAN OF THE NEz PERcE, UMATILLA, WARM SPRINGS, AND
YAKAMA TRIBES 3-32 fig. 3.7 (1995) [hereinafter SPIRrr OF THE SALMON].
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I. The 1855 Treaties Reserve the Harvest of an Economically
Viable Fishery
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams, where
running through or bordering said reservation, isfurther secured
to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the
right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in
common with the citizens of the Territory, and of erecting
temporary buildings for curing them; together with the privilege
of hunting, gathering roots and berries and pasturing their
horses and cattle upon open and unclaimed land.'
In 1855, as May turned over into June, the Tribes convened in the Walla
Walla country of the Washington Territory for a treaty council with two
representatives from the United States. The U.S. representatives were
Governor Isaac Stevens from the Washington Territory and Superintendent
of Indian Affairs, Joel Palmer, from the Oregon Territory Having recently
negotiated treaties and extensive land cessions along the Washington coast,
Stevens was eager to complete treaties in the interior of the territory that
would secure access to timber, gold, and settlement routes to the coast. 5
Unlike Palmer, who served as a peace commissioner and sought amicable
settlements with the Indians to avoid bloodshed,6 the military-trained Stevens
was deceptive and ambitious as he sought to remove Indians from trade and
settlement routes leaving the choice places for white settlement.7
However, the Columbia Basin Indians were prepared for Stevens. The
Indians were well informed about what the white men wanted, and they
knew of tribes in California who had entered into treaties only to find them
worthless and their land gone.' To impede Stevens, Kamiakin, the most
3. Treaty with the Yakima, June 9, 1855, art. 3, 12 Stat. 951, 953. This provision in the
Yakama's (reflecting the tribe's recent change in the spelling of its name) treaty is nearly identical
to the fishing provisions contained in treaties with other Columbia Basin Tribes; see also Treaty
with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Nez Perces, June
11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Walla Walla, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945.
4. See Manuscript of the Proceedings at the 1855 Walla Walla Treaty Council (1855), in
ISAAC INGALLS STEvENs, A TRUE COpy OF THE RECORD OF THE OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS AT THE
COUNCIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, 1855, at 8 (Darrell Scott ed., 1985) [hereinafter
COUNCIL IN THE WALLA 'WALLA VALLEY].
5. See id. at 7.
6. See THEODORE STERN, CHIEFS & CHANGE IN THE OREGON COUNTY: INDIAN RELATIONS
AT FORT NEz PERCES 1818-1855, at 294 (1996) [hereinafter CHIEFS & CHANGE].
7. See id. Superintendent of Indian Affairs Stevens, charged with fulfilling federal trust
obligations to the Indians, was also known as the new Governor of the Washington Territory and
Chief Engineer responsible for surveying a proposed northern railroad. See COUNCIL IN THE
WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra note 4, at 8.
8. See CHIEFS & CHANGE, supra note 6, at 293; COUNCIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY,
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prominent Yakama chief, organized the Indians into a unified front whereby
they would establish tribal boundaries and not offer any land for sale to the
United States.' Yet after more than two weeks of negotiations, Stevens
remained undeterred." Finally, by dealing individually with the chiefs at
night, after the council had closed for the day, Stevens was able to induce
the chiefs into signing treaties." Nevertheless, the Indians' solidarity and
reluctance to negotiate served them well in reserving a greater part of their
land base" and their tribal fisheries.
The provisions agreed to at the 1855 Walla Walla council reserve to the
Tribes "[t]he exclusive right of taking fish.., in all the streams... running
through or boarding... [the] reservation .... [and] the right of taking fish
at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the
Territory." 3 Although courts use these provisions to determine the nature
of the Tribes' reserved fishing rights, this language is only an indication of
the fisheries' importance to the Tribes. It does not represent the Tribes' views
with regard to management of their fisheries. The importance of salmon
fishing to the Tribes is not fairly understood through the language of white
hands anxious to constrain tribal autonomy so that settlement and resource
appropriation could begin. Rather, U.S. courts and policy makers along the
Columbia and Snake Rivers need to read the treaties with an awareness of
what fishing means to the Tribes.
Read in the context of the Tribes' historical fishing practices, the 1855
treaties reserve to the Tribes' the harvest of an economically viable fishery.
Tribal history demonstrates that salmon fishing has always been the
foundation of the Tribes' economic structure. Recognizing the importance of
salmon to the Tribes, Stevens drafted treaty provisions that would assure
their reservation and protection. Moreover, in their negotiations with
Stevens, the Tribes insisted on maintaining their salmon harvests and relied
on Stevens' promises that the treaties would secure their fisheries against
detrimental encroachment. Using this history as a guide demonstrates that
the language of the 1855 treaties reserves more than the right to fish in a
nearly empty river.
supra note 4, at 13.
9. See CHRISTOPHER L. MILLER, PROPHETIC WORLDS: INDIANS AND WHITES ON THE
COLUMBIA PLATEAU 111-12 (1985); CHIEFS & CHANGE, supra note 6, at 275-76.
10. See CHIEFS & CHANGE, supra note 6, at 310.
I1. See id
12. For example, Stevens originally hoped to group the Cayuses, the Walla Wallas, and the
Umatilla onto the Nez Perees' reservation, but drafted another reservation for these tribes when
they did not consent to his original plan. See COUNCIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra
note 4, at 89-90.
13. Treaty with the Yakima, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951.
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A. Tribal Economies in the Columbia Basin
Tribal economies throughout the Columbia Basin depend on abundant
seasonal salmon harvests. Unlike extractive economies where resources are
consumed without regard for their long term sustainability, 4 the Tribes'
economic structure is highly dependent on maintaining the return of the
annual salmon runs. This dependence is demonstrated by the Tribes' cultures
which express the primacy of salmon in their peoples' lives." From time
immemorial, salmon have returned to provide the Tribes with physical and
spiritual nourishment. In this densely populated region of North America,"
there were "no legends in the tribal lore relating to pestilence, famine and
want along the river."'7 Rather, with salmon at their foundation, the Tribes'
economies flourished establishing the Columbia Basin as one of the great
cultural and economic centers of North America.1
8
Linking salmon with their continued survival, many of the region's Tribes
note that the origin of human life coincided with the arrival of fish in the
rivers."t In Wishram accounts of the arrival of humans, Coyote transforms
the spirit world into one which will provide for the coming humans." In one
account, Coyote learns of two Swallows who were preserving fish in a
pond.' Disguised, Coyote enters their camp to free the fish into the river.
Coyote tells the Swallows, "Soon now people will come into this land ....
Now they will come into this land; those fish will be the people's food ....
When the people will come they will catch the fish; . . ."' Releasing salmon
into the river, Coyote reorders the spirit world into the natural world to
provide for human sustenance.'
14. See LISA MIGHETrO & WESLEY J. EBEL, SAVING THE SALMON: A lhs'ToRY OFTHE U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERs' EFFORTS TO PROTECT ANADROMOUS FISH ON THE COLUMBIA AND
SNAKE RIVERS 18-26 (1994) (reporting on the wasteful and irresponsible fishing practices of
canneries and fisherman during the late 1800s while salmon were still abundant). "[R]efuse from
the canneries amounted to 7 million pounds every year." Id. at 25.
15. See Yvonne Smith & Laura Berg, Ancient Tradition Modem Reality, WANA CHINOOK
TYMOO, Issue 1, 1998, at 10.
16. See CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 29-30 (1985).
17. CLICK RELANDER Er AL., TREATY CENTENNIAL 1855-1955: THE YAKIMAS 41 (1955)
[hereinafter TREATY CENTENNIAL].
18. See id. at 42-44; SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 2-4.
19. See Barbara Leibhardt, Law, Environment, and Social Change in the Columbia River
Basin: The Yakama Indian Nation as a Case Study, 1840-1933, at 328-29 (1985) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley) (on file with author) [hereinafter Yakima
Indian Nation Case Study].
20. See JAROLD RAMEsY, COYOTE WAS GOING THERE: INDIAN LITERATURE OF THE
OREGON COUNTRY xxiv (Jarold Ramesy ed., 1977) [hereinafter COYOTE WAS GOING THERE];
Yakima Indian Nation Case Study, supra note 19, at 328.
21. See COYOTE WAS GOING THERE, supra note 20, at 47.
22. Id. at 49.
23. See id. at xxiii-xxiv; EUGENE S. HUNN, NcH'I-WANA, THE BIG RIVER: MID-COLUMBIA
No. 21
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The Tribes' historical reliance on salmon is well documented by the
testimony taken in United States v. Winans.' In this case, the Winans
brothers displaced a highly productive Yakama fishery by purchasing
property fronting the Columbia River and erecting state licensed fish wheels
in the prime fishing locations. Seeking enforcement of their 1855 treaty
reservations, many Yakama came before the United States District Court in
the Southern Division of Washington to testify about their dependence on
salmon and the nourishment the fish provided.
One witness, William Speedies, was fifteen at the time of the 1855
treaties and a lifelong resident of the Wisham fishery. He stated, "[Salmon]
is the only thing we have been raised on; that is all I depend on ...
[Without salmon,] I am just pretty near dried out.... Whenever I had [sic]
plenty of salmon to eat I am healthy, I am strong; .. ."' Another Yakama
fisherman, Louis Simpson, who was a grown man at the time of the 1855
treaties, stated, "Now you see the Indians used to have a good time and eat
lots of fish, but now their mouth is dry.... [Salmon] makes a man look
fresh and stout. The Indians that were raised [at the fishery] were fat. I am
a fat looking man myself. I eat salmon and berries.""
In addition, Chief White Swan, a plaintiff in the Winans case, explained
how farm raised animals do not provide for the Indians as the salmon do.
He testified, "They could not very well without salmon get along - the
Indians. were raised with salmon and they want salmon all the time.... I
can't myself get along without the salmon. I don't know how to eat hog
meat; 1' don't like it well myself, and that is the way with the other Indians,
I suppose."' Indeed, many of the other Indians to testify before the court
stated that without salmon they were "hungry," "dry," or had "nothing to
eat."
This same hunger for salmon is expressed generations later by the region's
Tribes. A 1998 issue of Wana Chinook Tymoo, a publication of the
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, asks, "Can cultures based on
salmon survive without the sacred fish?" Reporting on modern conditions,
the journal notes that the shortage of salmon has imposed dramatic changes
in the Tribes' diet resulting in deteriorating physical health similar to that
expressed by the Winans plaintiffs" As the availability of traditional foods,
like salmon, decreases the rate of diabetes, cancer, and heart disease has
INDIANS AND THEIR LAND 154-55 (1990).
24. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
25. See id. at 377-79.
26. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 177-78, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905) (No. 180); Record at 100-01, Winans (No. 180).
27. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 130-33; Record at 70.72, Winans (No. 180).
28. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 103; Record at 54, Winans (No. 180).
29. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 161; Record at 90, Winans (No. 180).
30. See Smith & Berg, supra note 15, at 14.
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increased among the Columbia Basin Tribes.' Unlike their ancestors who
lived into their nineties and beyond, the Indian people of the Basin today
face a below-average life expectancy and a high death rate. 2
Before European settlers inundated the rivers with dams and irrigation
ditches, the Columbia Basin Tribes flourished from the enormous salmon
runs. The rivers were "richly stocked"3  with salmon and provided
"aboriginal luxury" and "wealth."' According to revised estimations of the
pre-contact population, adjusted to account for the spread of European
infectious diseases, the Tribes' annual harvest was 41 to 43 million pounds
or 4.5 to 6.3 million fish. Harvesting this number of fish was not a
sporadic recreational pursuit. Rather, like farming, the abundant and regular
salmon runs assured the Tribes a consistent harvest to maintain their
economic viability.'
The Tribes tailored their economic structure around the geography of the
Columbia Basin to ensure their long term economic sustainability. Before the
dams hegemonized the landscape, the Columbia and Snake Rivers were
punctuated by a rocky shoreline creating narrow, swift-moving channels. In
these places, the Tribes' primary fishing grounds, the current forced salmon
to the surface of the water enabling the Tribes' harvest.' A single dip of a
fisherman's net retrieved one, two, or three fifty pound fish.' Using dip
nets and spears, an experienced hand could catch approximately 100 salmon,
or two to three tons, in a day's work. 9
The extent of the harvest was reflected in tribal diets. In addition to roots,
berries, and deer meat, salmon were an important staple providing up to 40%
of the Tribes' diet.6 Given this heavy reliance on salmon, the Tribes
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Helen Hersh Schuster, Yakima Indian Traditionalism: A Study in Continuity and
Change 73-74 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Yakima Indian Traditionalism].
34. See TREATY CENTENNIAL, supra note 17, at 41; RICHARD WHrrE, ORGANIC MACHINE
23 (1995).
35. See Joseph E. Taylor, III, Making Salmon: Economy Culture, and Science in the Oregon
Fisheries, Pre-contact to 1960, at 29 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Washington) (on file with author) [hereinafter Making Salmon]; NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING
COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE
COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 69-75 (1986).
36. See Making Salmon, supra note 35, at 14; Yakima Indian Nation Case Study, supra note
19, at 326-28 (discussing the seasonal timing various salmon runs utilized by the Yakama).
37. See HUNN, supra note 23, at 148; WHITE, supra note 34, at 16.
38. See TREATY CENTENNIAL, supra note 17, at 42.
39. See id.
40. See WHT, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that salmon made up 30 to 40% of the
Indians' diet); Yakima Indian Nation Case Study, supra note 19, at 329 (reporting 33%); see also
Making Salmon, supra note 35, at 21; Brief for Appellants at 7, United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180).
No. 2]
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developed a variety of ways to prepare their harvest. The Tribes utilized
smoke houses, dried salmon on poles, cooked them in the sun, or
concentrated the fish into a mixture called C'lMy.' These rich salmon
harvests also sustained the Tribes through the winter months. A family might
store 600-700 pounds of dried salmon in preparation for the winter 2
Describing the proportion of salmon in the Indians' diet, Thomas Simpson,
a Winans plaintiff, stated, "That is the greatest food they have; ... that is
what raised us."'4 Decades later, a 1941 Bureau of Indian Affairs study
reported that the average Yakama family consumed 1800 pounds of salmon
per year." Thus, after more than a century of contact with Europeans,
salmon continued to be an important staple in the Tribes' diet.
As salmon provided the Columbia Basin Tribes' primary spiritual and
physical nourishment, the Tribes also derived their principle trade and
economic activities from their salmon harvests." Many of the Indians to
testify in the Winans case made clear that they depended on the salmon
harvests "for their living."' In addition, observers of the nineteenth-century
Indian fisheries noted that, "the Indians makes [sic] the salmon their
commodity of trade, '47 as they engaged in salmon "trade... and [they] sold
them.'
Extensive salmon trade existed in the region both prior to European
contact and after. Before the reservoirs inundated the Dalles and Celilo Falls,
these falls were recognized as the principle trading centers of the Columbia
Basin 9 Tribes from as far as the Plains, Northern California, and Puget
Sound traveled a network of trails leading to these economic centers." In
the Winans testimony it was stated that the trails had been used for
"hundreds of years,"51 were "well beaten, . . . [and] at places they were
forty or fifty feet wide. ' Tribes traveling to the region imported skins,
furs, slaves, wool, clothing, shells, dried deer and buffalo meat, seal oil and
meat, hemp, wood carvings, and berries.' The most desired export obtained
41. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 141; Record at 77, Winans (No. 180);
Smith & Berg, supra note 15, at 14.
42. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 141; Record at 77, Winans (No. 180).
43. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 91; Record at 47, Winans (No. 180).
44. See Yakima Indian Nation Case Study, supra note 19, at 330 (citing Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Officials Makes Survey of Diets (Aug. 2, 1945) (located in folder "Indians-Yakima-
Government," Yakima Valley Museum, Yakima, WA)).
45. Brief for Appellants at 41-42, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180).
46. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 162; Record at 91, Winans (No. 180).
47. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 231; Record at 135, Winans (No. 180).
48. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 289; Record at 173, Winans (No. 180).
49. See TREATY CENTENNIAL, supra note 17, at 43; WHITE, supra note 34, at 23.
50. See Making Salmon, supra note 35, at 31.
51. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 258; Record at 153, Winans (No. 180).
52. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 267; Record at 159, Winans (No. 180).




from the Columbia Basin Tribes was pemmican. Pemmican, a dried
concentrated salmon meal, traveled well and provided nourishment through
the winter.'
Moreover, the economic significance of Columbia Basin salmon was not
lost on the non-Indian settlers. With more than fifty successful canneries
operating at mouth of the Columbia River in 1883,"5 settlers further
upstream in the Columbia Basin also invested in the valuable salmon
harvests. For example, in 1889 the Winans brothers purchased more than
seventy acres of non-agricultural land and spent $18,000 to construct and
maintain four fish wheels on the Columbia River.' In addition, on the
Oregon side of the river, one of the Seufert brothers' fish wheels harvested
an annual 146,000 pounds of salmon per season.' Seufert also invested in
purchasing salmon from the Indians. In 1895 he purchased 183,440 pounds,
and in 1896 he purchased 55,209.58 Thus, in 1895 for approximately six
months of work, tribal fishermen could earn up to $5500 selling salmon to
a local cannery.59 As Helen Hersh Schuster concluded in her extensive
dissertation of the social and political organization of the Yakama Indians,
"[f]ishing was a major economic activity.'
Commercial trade remained a significant source of income for the Tribes
despite the considerable economic changes of the twentieth century. A 1940s
study indicated that while the Tribes consumed most of their salmon harvest,
40% of the harvest went to the market.6' Even later, in 1956 before Celilo
Falls was inundated by water filling in behind the Dallas Dam, salmon
continued to be an important economic resource for the Tribes. The flooding
of Celilo Falls cut off means of support to many Indians and increased
unemployment on the Yakama reservation by 45%.' Thus, well into the
54. See Making Salmon, supra note 35, at 31-32.
55. See MIGHMrrO & EBEL, supra note 14, at 19.
56. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 330, 347-51; Record at 200, 212-13,
Winans (No. 180).
57. See MiGHErrO & EBEL, supra note 14, at 24.
58. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 289; Record at 173, Winans (No. 180).
59. In 1895, salmon sold for one to three cents a pound. Thus, for 183,440 pounds of
salmon the proceeds ranged from $1834 to $5503. Seufert estimated the proceeds at $3500 to
$5000. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 294-97; Record at 177-78, Winans (No.
180).
60. Yakima Indian Traditionalism, supra note 33, at 67.
61. See Yakima Indian Nation Case Study, supra note 19, at 339-40 (citing Office of Indian
Affairs, Circular of Information to Superintendents, Wildlife Conservation Officers, etc., Minutes
of Meeting of Indian Service Personnel in the Pacific Northwest to Discuss Indian Hunting,
Fishing, and Trapping Problems (May 28, 1940) (located in folder 115B "General Wildlife
Correspondence and Circulars," Box 351, Decimal Subject File 921, Yakima Agency, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, National Archives-Seattle)).
62. See Yakima Indian Traditionalism, supra note 33, at 294.
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twentieth century, the Tribes relied on salmon harvests to maintain their
economies.
The Columbia Basin Tribes' relationship to salmon is all encompassing.
Although non-Indians have sometimes recognized the spiritual and cultural
aspects of this relationship, non-Indians must also acknowledge the economic
imporumce of salmon to the Tribes. From time immemorial, the Columbia
Basin Indians have relied on their salmon harvests to nourish themselves and
as a basis for extensive trade. Salmon were, and continue to be, the heart of
the Tribes' economies. Thus, in their 1855 treaty negotiations, the Tribes
reserved more than the opportunity to recreationally fish at the river's edge.
Rather, the fishing provisions contained in the 1855 treaties were intended
to secure the Tribes' economic livelihood.
B. Negotiating to Reserve their Salmon Economies
Dep-.ndent on salmon for their primary nourishment and economic
livelihood, the Tribes emphasized the importance of maintaining their salmon
fisheries in the 1855 treaty negotiations with the U.S. However, subsequent
development of the Columbia Basin has extensively degraded the Tribes'
fisheries. This violation continues even though all parties to the 1855 treaties
knew that the fishing provisions were essential to finalizing any agreement.
To comply with the legal rights and responsibilities of the 1855 treaty fishing
provisions, federal agencies must govern the Columbia Basin to provide for
the maintenance of the Tribes' economic resources.
Recognizing the Columbia Basin Tribes' dependence and insistence on
maintaining their salmon fisheries, the Stevens Treaty Commission developed
fishing provisions specifically for its treaties with the Indians of the Pacific
Northwest.' The provisions were the result of reports from Indian agents
in the region and Stevens' research. The idea appears to be first mentioned
in a report by an Indian agent on Puget Sound. His 1853 annual report
recommended that "when treaties are made with these tribes, . . . their
fishing grounds [should] be granted [to] them."" A year later, Stevens
initiated research on the Indians' economic activities to help him develop
treaty provisions that would secure the Tribes' fisheries.
63. Report from Edward Swindell, Jr., to the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of
Indian Affairs, Report on Source, Nature and Extent of the Fishing, Hunting and Miscellaneous
Related Rights of Certain Indian Tribes in Washington and Oregon Together with Affidavits
Showing Location of a Number of Usual and Accustomed Fishing Grounds and Stations 1 (Aug.
26, 1942) (on file with author) [hereinafter Swindell Report].
64. See Summary of Anthropological Report from Barbara Lane, Ph.D. to the court in United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), Political and Economic Aspects of
Indian-White Culture Contact in Western Washington in the Mid-19th Century 25 (May 10, 1973)
(on file with author) (quoting a 1853 report from E. A. Starling, Indian agent for Puget Sound)




The research prepared for Treaty Commissioner Stevens reveals that the
commission generally understood that the Tribes' fisheries were central to
their economic structure.' Much of this research was performed by George
Gibbs, a lawyer-ethnologist who drafted Stevens' 1854-55 treaties along the
coast of Washington.' Visiting the Columbia Basin as a member of
Stevens' survey party for the projected northern route of the transcontinental
railroad,3 Gibbs' observed the Indians' fishing practices. Gibbs reported
to Stevens regarding the location of fishing grounds, the importance of the
salmon as food staple, and the extensive salmon trade.' Subsequently, at
a meeting in early December 1854, the Stevens Treaty Commission drafted
the provisions that would account for this important aspect of the Indians'
economies." Probably looking to Gibbs' expertise, the commission
described the Tribes' reserved fisheries as "usual and accustomed" and "in
common with the citizens of the Territory.""' Having developed these
unique provisions, Stevens must have known that securing the Tribes'
fisheries was essential to reaching an agreement with the Tribes.
Significantly, the language of the fishing provisions developed by the
Stevens Treaty Commission in the winter of 1854 contained no restrictions
on tribal fishing. Reviewing this language for the U.S. Department of Justice
in the United States v. Washington litigation,' Dr. Barbara Lane concluded
that the commission did not contemplate or intend any restrictions on tribal
fishing.' Assessing the phrase "usual and accustomed," Lane stated, "There
is no mention of restrictions as to purpose, time, or method of taking
[salmon] either in the treaties themselves or in the official records relating
to treaty proceedings."'7 Similarly, Lane found "nothing in the official
record to suggest that the U.S. intended 'in common' to connote future
control by 'citizens' over Indians."' Looking at all the available evidence,
she concluded that both parties intended for the Tribes to continue harvesting
65. See Report from Barbara Lane to the Department of Justice, Usual and Accustomed
Indian Fisheries in the Yakima Basin: Anthropological and Ethnohistorical Evidence 20 (Dec.
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Usual & Accustomed Indian Fisheries].
66. See Political & Economic Aspects, supra note 64, at 25.
67. See COUNCIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra note 4, at 8.
68. See Political & Economic Aspects, supra note 64, at 8.
69. See Usual & Accustomed Indian Fisheries, supra note 65, at 14-19.
70. See id. at 7.
71. See Political & Economic Aspects, supra note 64, at 25-26.
72. See generally United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (conducting an extensive
analysis of the 1855 Treaty language).
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salmon as before which would provide for the Tribes' prosperity and
contribute to the region's economy."
The emphasis on maintaining the Tribes' salmon economies is also evident
in statements made by the Indians participating in the treaty negotiations."
For example, Young Chief of the Cayuses was disturbed by Stevens'
evasiveness about the specifics of his offer. Unsure whether Stevens
intended to protect the Tribes' fisheries, Young Chief described the Indians'
inseparability from the salmon runs. He remarked,
The reason that I do not know anything about this ground is I do
not see the offer you have made us yet.... Though I hear what
the [E]arth says. The Earth says, God has placed me here. The
[E]arth says that God tells me to take care of the Indians on this
[E]arth. The Earth says to the Indians that fish on the Earth feed
them right.... The water speaks the same way."a
Continuing, he insisted that the Indians relationship to salmon cannot be
changed. Young Chief stated, "Neither the Indians or the whites have a right
to change those names."' Thus, for the Tribes to agree with Stevens'
bargain, Young Chief insisted that their salmon fisheries be maintained as
they knew them.
Similarly, White Swan, a Chief of the Yakamas at the treaty council, later
explained in Winans how the fishing provisions were essential to reaching
an agreement. White Swan explained in detail,
When they made the treaty... everyday day the council held for
a month, and the second month they had not quite agreed yet,
and the second month, about the middle of the month; ...
[Stevens], at that time announced to the [Indians], saying what
is the reason you do not agree to this good law; then the Indians
said at that time we will now mention why we do not want to
agree to this bargain. I do love my food - that is, the salmon
in the river, here it is very hard for me to say all right, ...
therefore I do not like to go to the little reservation and leave my
fish. And then at that time Governor Stevens said, yes, I find out
now what you want, I will agree with you now and tell you what
you want exactly. You people that live as far as Cascade, and as
far as up to Wenatchee, you have your rights in this Columbia
River to get this fish; the Great Father in Washington is not
asking you for this river or this salmon, all the Great Father
76. See id. at 26, 43.
77. See CouNcIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra note 4, at 77, 89.




wants [is] the land for whites to settle by and by. But as long as
this world stays here you will have all the salmon you want in
this river all the time.... And of course at that time all the
Indians along the Columbia River... said all right, if this is the
case we will agree at this council.'
Thus, the Tribes would not consent to the treaties until they were sure that
the agreement secured their economic resources.
In addition, throughout the negotiations, Stevens reassured the Tribes that
he intended to secure their salmon harvests." On different occasions,
Stevens told the Tribes that the reservations contained "plenty of salmon"'
or were near "the best fisheries on the Snake river."" He also told the
Indians that "[they] will be allowed to go to the usual fishing places and fish
in common with the whites ...."' Assessing Stevens' carefully chosen
language, anthropological researchers concluded that the Tribes understood
Stevens to mean that they could "return to any and all of those numerous
places where they had theretofore used and ... continue to take fish ....
[And] both the waters in which the fish were caught and the land upon
which their camps and smoke houses were erected were the things being
reserved for their continued use."'
Finally, the testimony given in Winans provides further evidence of the
Tribes' understanding of 1855 treaty provisions. When the Winans brothers'
fences and fish wheels prevented the Tribes from harvesting their economic
resources, the Indians explicitly described to the court their understanding of
the treaty negotiations. With reference to the economic viability of their
fisheries, White Salmon Charley, an interpreter at the treaty council,
explained that Stevens had assured the Tribes that "the Government ain't
wanting to buy what you are using for your life."' Rather, "the
Government only wants to buy the land and the timber. The Indians [get]
salmon and the deer and the roots and the berries and grounds for horses.
[Further,] the fisheries the Indians were to keep forever, where the Indians
were then catching salmon.'
80. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 98, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905) (No. 180); Record at 51-52, Winans (No. 180) (emphasis added).
81. See COUNCIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra note 4, at 64, 65, 67, 98, 102.
82. Id. at 64.
83. Id. at 65.
84. Id. at 67.
85. Swindell Report, supra note 63, at 62; see also Usual & Accustomed Indian Fisheries,
supra note 65, at 40.
86. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 133-34, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905) (No. 180); Record at 72, Winans (No. 180).
87. Id.
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Bill Charley, a resident of the Wisham fishery also stated to the court,
When the treaty had been made the old people had said, we want
this; this is our privilege, this fishing right, this place; we want
this always to be laid out for us and people to fish; that is where
that wheel is to-day . . . The law said when they made the
treaty with them, . . . he said you shall be never disturbed in
your rights; ....""
Thus, relying on Stevens' reassurances that they could return their fishing
sites to harvest salmon forever and that the settlers would not diminish their
ability to harvest and trade salmon, the Tribes consented to the provisions of
the 1855 treaties.' Consequently, whether it is the Winans brothers' fish
wheels or a hydroelectric dam, the 1855 treaties prohibit encroachment that
disturbs the Tribes' reservation of an economically viable salmon harvest.
The importance of the fishing provisions to the 1855 treaties cannot be
understated. Recognizing that the land sessions he sought would be
dependent on inclusion of the fishing provisions, Stevens went to extensive
lengths to understand the Tribes' reliance on salmon and to write provisions
that would not restrict the Tribes' harvest. Despite these efforts, the Tribes
reluctantly bargained with Stevens until he made clear that he was not asking
the Tribes to relinquish their fisheries. The records of the treaty council and
subsequent statements of those present at the negotiations, demonstrate that
the Tribes required Stevens to ensure that their fisheries would be protected
against extensive non-Indian encroachmentL0 In this atmosphere, all of the
parties 1:o. the 1855 treaties recognized that securing the fisheries was
essential to the agreement.
Indeed, ceding 64 million acres of land to the U.S. in the 1855 treaties,
the Tribes needed to reserve their fisheries to maintain their cultural and
economic health. Moreover, an economically viable fishery was the only
type of fishery the Tribes knew. Since time immemorial the salmon fisheries
sustained their communities and provided a valuable resource for trade. In
the treaty negotiations, neither Stevens nor the Tribes contemplated that U.S.
settlement and development would degrade the fisheries' economic viability.
To the contrary, as Palmer explained at the treaty council, "If we make a
treaty with you and our Great Chief and his council approves it, you can rely
88. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 163; Record at 91-92, Winans (No. 180).
89. See Swindell Report, supra note 63, at 58, 64.
90. Brief for Appellants at 8, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180)
(noting that the Yakama's present at the treaty negotiations had testified before the Winans court
that they lelieved and understood that, "the United States was guaranteeing and preserving to
them a rea right which they had always enjoyed and without which they would not have entered
into the treaty. It is shown that there was a demur over this very matter and the negotiations of
Governor Stevens and General Palmer were not successful until the Indians had complete




on all its provisions being carried out strictly, . ... "' In fact, no
congressional legislation authorizing dam construction has ever sought to
abrogate or limit U.S. obligations to the Tribes' fisheries.
III. The 1855 Treaties are a Continuing Source of Law
Governing the Columbia Basin
The treaty gave the right. Congress has never divested the Indians
of the right.f
Despite developing the Columbia Basin to favor resource extraction over
the Tribes' sustainable salmon economies, the legislation authorizing
development and management of the Columbia Basin continually recognizes
the importance of the salmon runs as well as U.S. treaty obligations to the
Tribes.' This congressional affirmation is reflected in the efforts of federal
agencies, such as the Army Corps and the Northwest Power Planning Council
(NPPC), to conserve salmon populations.' Unfortunately, the mitigation
policies employed by these agencies and approved by Congress have failed
to sustain salmon populations.
Nevertheless, congressional legislation authorizing dam development and
initiating conservation of salmon populations has recognized the continuing
legal force of the treaties. First, principles of treaty abrogation described by
the United States Supreme Court indicate that congressional legislation never
abrogated the 1855 treaties with the Columbia Basin Tribes. Moreover,
congressional hearings and authorizing legislation affirmed the continuing
viability of the treaties. Finally, as salmon populations declined below self-
sustainable levels, Congress directed that federal agencies take steps to fulfill
their obligations under the 1855 treaties through conservation programs.
However, given the failure of these programs, it is now imperative that
Congress directly address the cause of its treaty violation.
A. The United States Never Abrogated the 1855 Treaties
Authorizing development of the Columbia Basin, the U.S. Congress never
abrogated the 1855 treaties in which the Tribes reserved the harvest of an
economically viable fishery. To avoid interfering with the resources reserved
for the Tribes' economic livelihood, Congress endorsed a plan to mitigate the
effects of the dams and allow passage of migrating salmon. While these
91. COUNCi. IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra note 4, at 55.
92. Brief for Appellants at 36, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180).
93. See Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failure and a Dubious
Future, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 667, 672 (1992) [hereinafter Saving Idaho's Salmon].
94. See generally MIGHFrO & EBEL, supra note 14, at 103-47 (discussing the attempts of
the Army Corps to mitigate the effects of the dams); KErrH C. PEERSEN. RIvER OF DEATH,
CHANNEL OF LIFE: FISH AND DAMS ON THE LOWER SNAKE 108-18 (1995).
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technological fixes have failed to sustain salmon populations, the laws
securing the Tribes' salmon harvests have never been abandoned.
As with any foreign nation, Congress could abrogate its treaties with Indian
Nations by the subsequent passage of a statute or an act of Congress."
However, Congress never authorized the abrogation of the 1855 treaties with
the Columbia Basin Tribes. Rather, principles of treaty abrogation
demonstrate that subsequent statutes authorizing hydropower development
uphold the treaties.
For treaty abrogation to occur, the U.S. Supreme Court requires that acts
of Congress show a "clear and plain" intent to abrogate an Indian treaty.'
While the Court's inquiry varies from case to case, it recently stated that
"[w]hat is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty." 7
The Court's "clear evidence" of abrogation may be found in the "legislative
history," "surrounding circumstances," or on "the face of the act.""0 Thus,
abrogation need not be explicitly stated by the statute, but the record
developed by Congress must make clear a congressional intent to abrogate the
treaty.
In addition, the Supreme Court does not permit treaties to be abrogated in
"a backhanded way."' Because the U.S. consistently affirms the Columbia
Basin treaties while pursuing a course of development that decimated the
Tribes' fisheries, this principle of treaty abrogation is particularly important
here. Rejecting such abrogation, in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United
States, the Court held that the Termination Act of 1954, while ending the
federal trust relationship with the Menominee, did not nullify the tribe's
reservation of hunting and fishing rights."w The Court found it "difficult to
believe" that Congress would subject the U.S. to a claim for compensation by
destroying the Menominee's hunting and fishing rights without an "explicit
statement."10' Likewise, the fishing provisions of the treaties with Columbia
Basin Tribes could not -have been abrogated by the backhanded effect of
statutes authorizing river development. Rather, as the Menominee case
95. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,720 (1893); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
96. FELiX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 223 (Rennard Strickland ct al.
eds., 1982); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
97. Dion, 476 U.S. at 73940.
98. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412
U.S. 481 (1973)).
99. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968).
100. See id. at 412-13.




requires, Congress may only abrogate a treaty provision with an "explicit
statement" of its intent."
The Supreme Court repeated these principles in Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,3 its most recent
case interpreting the 1855 fishing provisions."3 With regard to the
continuing viability of the treaties, the Court stated that, "[a]bsent explicit
statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional
abrogation of treaty rights."'"3 Although this case did not address the impact
of hydropower development on the Tribes' fisheries, the Court upheld the
continuing viability of the treaties. Thus, in 1979, applying U.S. principles
of treaty abrogation to the 1855 treaties, the Supreme Court confirmed that the
treaties had not been abrogated by subsequent congressional legislation.
B. Legislation Authorizing Dam Construction Affirms the 1855 Treaties
Neither the legislation authorizing Columbia and Snake River dams, nor
their legislative history, indicates a "clear and plain" intent to abrogate the
fishing provisions of the 1855 treaties with the Columbia Basin Tribes. To the
contrary, beginning in the 1930s with Bonneville Dam, Congress attempted
to ensure that river development would not diminish the fisheries along the
Columbia and Snake Rivers."3 Prior to dam construction, Congress directed
that "the question of the necessary provision for the passage of fish over the
dams . . . will require more definite determination. The salmon fishing
industry is of great importance to the states of Oregon and Washington, and
should not be endangered.""3 Consequently, the design of Bonneville Dam,
the first federal dam on the Columbia River, included fish ladders and fish
lifts.'°" Moreover, to ensure the fish passage facilities met the approval of
local fishery agencies and commercial fishers, Congress expended an extra
$1.1 million, for a total of $3.2 million, to improve the design of the
facilities." ' Thus, as Congress began to develop the Basin, it resolved the
conflict between dams and salmon by investing heavily in mitigation measures
to ensure that returning adult salmon would reach the Tribes' upstream
fisheries.
102. Id.
103. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
104. See id. at 662-87. See discussion of the Court's interpretation of the fishing provisions
infra Part IV.C.
105. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)).
106. See id. at 691-92.
107. See Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 93, at 672; MiGHaro & EBEL, supra note 14,'
at 54.
108. H.R. Exic. Doc. No. 73-103, at 1537, 1539, 1599, 1603 (1932).
109. See MIHIrro & EBEL, supra note 14, at 55.
110. Seeid,
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Having resolved the issues concerning upstream passage of salmon,
Congress then sought to eliminate threats to downstream juvenile migration.
However, the testimony before Congress demonstrates that law makers were
so misinformed about the effects of the dams on downstream migration, that
they could not have intended to sacrifice the Tribes' fish for hydropower
development. To the contrary, the Army Corps assured Congress that the
Columbia Basin could have both dams and salmon.
In hearings before the Senate Committee on Rivers and Harbors in 1941
and 1943, the Army Corps testified on two occasions that the dams'
hydropower turbines would not harm juvenile salmon during their downstream
migration."' In 1941, Assistant Chief of Engineers Brigadier General
Thomas M. Robins testified,
[The] turbines are absolutely incapable of hurting the fish. If you
could put a mule through there, and keep him from drowning he
would go through without being hurt. Before we put the wheels
in, we carried on expirements [sic] with fish, and proved
conclusively that the pressure of the turbines will not injure
fish."
2
Later, in 1943, Army Corps'General Kingman informed Congress that he did
not "think it bothers [the fingerlings] at all to go through the turbines."13
Thus, finding no conflict between dams and the downstream migration of
salmon, Congress could not have intend to decimate salmon populations by
choosing to develop the rivers. Rather, considering the testimony before it,
Congress took the precautions it thought necessary to preserve the fisheries
and avoid abrogating its obligations to sustain the Tribes' economically viable
salmon harvests.
Further, authorizing much of the remaining hydropower development on
the Columbia and Snake Rivers, Congress included in the 1945 Rivers and
Harbors Act its intent to preserve fisheries along the Columbia and Snake
Rivers. In the section of the Act authorizing McNary Dam, the last dam on
the Columbia before the confluence with the Snake River, Congress required
that "in the design, construction, and operation of [McNary] Dam, adequate
provision shall be made for the protection of anadromous fishes by affording
them access to their natural spawning grounds. . . In addition to this
direct support of the fisheries, the plain language of the Act did not indicate
111. See Snake River, Oreg., Wash., and Idaho, Hearings Before the Comm. on Rivers and
Harbors, 75th Cong. 15 (1941); Columbia River (Umatilla Dam) and Snake River, Oreg., Wash.,
and Idaho, Hearings Before the Comm. on Rivers and Harbors, 78th Cong. 5 (1943).
112. Snake River, Oreg., Wash., and Idaho, Hearings Before the Comm. on Rivers and
Harbors, 75th Cong. 15 (1941).
113. Columbia River (Umatilla Dam) and Snake River. Oreg., Wash., and Idaho, Hearings
Before th, Comm. on Rivers and Harbors, 78th Cong. 5 (1943).
114. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-14, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 22 (1945).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss2/4
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a "clear and plain" intent to abrogate the treaties. Rather, authorizing
development on the lower Snake River, Congress simply allowed for "the
construction of such dams as necessary.""11
Significantly, the plain language of the 1945 Rivers and Harbors Act also
confirms that when Congress was aware that development would conflict with
the treaties, Congress offered to replace what was lost in the conflict.
Considering the conflict between Bonneville Dam and "usual and accustomed"
fishing sites that would be flooded by the dam, Congress acknowledged the
loss and provided alternative fishing locations."6 Thus, reading the 1945
Rivers and Harbors Act in its entirety, Congress considered the effects the
dams would have on the Tribes' fishing practices and consistently mitigated
those effects attempting to protect the Tribes' reserved salmon harvests.
C. Management and Conservation Statutes Affirm the 1855 Treaties
As Congress moved from constructing hydropower projects to managing
development in the Columbia Basin, its conservation statutes required
balancing industrial interests with salmon survival. In 1958, Congress
strengthened the 1945 Rivers and Harbors Act, to prevent river development
from eclipsing the salmon fisheries. Amending the 1945 Act, Congress
required that "wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration" as
hydropower development."' Although development interests were eager to
harness the rivers' power to extract electrical resources, Congress recognized
the importance of the salmon industry and "never... intended the salmon to
be sacrificed in pursuit of navigation, irrigation, or hydropower."" 8 Rather,
recent Columbia Basin conservation legislation recognizes the 1855 treaties
as an important component of hydropower regulation.
Reorganizing the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) to
prioritize salmon conservation, the 1980 Northwest Power Act (NPA) required
compliance with continuing treaty obligations and emphasized the role of the
Tribes in salmon conservation.' Speaking directly on this point, the Act
states that recovery plans must "be consistent with the legal rights of
appropriate Indian tribes in the region; ...," Thus, the plain language of
the NPA affirms U.S. treaty obligations to the Tribes. Moreover, the
provisions of the NPA indicate that the treaties have broad implications for
how the region is managed and developed.
115. Id. §2,59Stat. at21.
116. Id. § 2, 59 Stat. at 22.
117. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 85-624, § 2,72 Stat. 563, 563 (1958).
118. See Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 93, at 671-72.
119. See generdlly Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1994); Michael C.
Blunim, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, 14 ENvTL L. 277, 285 (1984).
120. Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(D) (1994).
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In the NPA, Congress requires that salmon conservation plans defer to
tribal recommendations. To carry out these efforts, the Act created the NPPC
to use hydropower revenues to develop a comprehensive program to protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife resources.'2' In developing its Fish
and Wildlife Program, Congress requires that the NPPC rely on the
recommendations of the region's Indian Tribes." For each recommendation,
the NPPC must give "due weight to the recommendations, expertise, and legal
rights and responsibilities" of the Tribes." If the NPPC does not adopt a
particular recommendation for one of three statutorily defined reasons, the
NPPC is required to explain its reasoning in writing.'" Thus, presumptively
favoring tribal recommendations, Congress sought to ensure that the NPPC's
salmon conservation plans would be consistent with U.S. treaty obligations to
the Tribes.
Interpreting the NPA's provisions in Northwest Resource Information
Center v. NPPC," the Ninth Circuit upheld Congress' intent to conform
hydropower operations to the requirements of the 1855 treaties." In
Northwest Resource Info. Center, the court determined that the NPPC's 1991-
92 Fish and Wildlife Program did not fulfill the requirements of the NPA and
remanded the plan back to the NPPC." To aid the NPPC on remand, the
court interpreted the NPA's five criteria for a successful conservation program.
Describing the requirement that the program comply with U.S. treaty
obligations, the Court held that this requirement "significantly circumscribe[s]
the [NPPC]'s discretion."'" Moreover, the court ruled that the NPA directs
the NPPC to give a "high degree of deference" to interpretations of the statute
and recommendations submitted by the Tribes and other fishery agencies.'29
Reading the NPA as an attempt to "revolutionize" the FCRPS, the Ninth
Circuit upheld Congress' deference to the 1855 treaties as a continuing source
of legal obligations in the Columbia Basin.
As this recent conservation legislation demonstrates, the Tribes' 1855 treaty
reservations were never abrogated by Congress. Rather, beginning with fish
passage facilities at Bonneville Dam to reorganization under the NPA,
Congress attempted to ensure that river development would not prevent the
121. See id. § 839.
122. See id. § 839b(h)(5).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7).
124. See id. §§ 839b(h)(7)(A),(B),(C).
125. 35 P.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 50 (1995).
126. See id. at 1386-89.
127. See id. at 1395.
128. Id. at 1389.
129. Id. at 1389, 1392.
130. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the Parity Promise: Struggling to Save Columbia





Tribes' economic harvest of their treaty fisheries. When fishing sites were lost
to river development, Congress provided alternative sites, and in the latter half
of the twentieth century when salmon populations continued to decline,
Congress wrote statutes requiring compliance with U.S. treaty obligations.
The "plain language" and legislative history of these sources of law indicate
that the 1855 treaties with the Tribes have never been abrogated by the U.S.
Thus, consistent with these laws, federal agencies governing the Columbia
Basin must move beyond development policies that diminish the Tribes'
fisheries and violate the 1855 treaty provisions.
IV. Supreme Court Precedent Interpreting and Enforcing
the 1855 Treaties Requires the Tribes' Fisheries
Be Maintained at Economically Viable Levels
I have something different to say than the others have said. It is
your men who have spoken. I have been afraid of the white man.
Their doings are different from ours. Your chiefs are good.
Perhaps you have spoke straight, that your children will do what
is right. Let them do as they have promised. That is all I have to
say. 1
3
In three far reaching federal Indian law cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
established precedent interpreting the 1855 treaties and quantifying
enforcement levels for protection of treaty reserved economic resources.
These cases require that development be limited or removed to maintain the
Columbia Basin Tribes' salmon harvests at economically viable levels. To
comply with this longstanding precedent, federal agencies governing the
FCRPS must move beyond their failed mitigation policies and begin reducing
U.S. development to recover salmon populations to levels enforced by the
Supreme Court.
First, in United States v. Winans, the Supreme Court relied on testimony
of the Yakama's economic hardship to enforce their 1855 treaty as imposing
a development servitude against activities that threatened the Tribes' fisheries.
Second, in Winters v. United States, the Court quantified its protection of
tribal economic resources requiring that treaty-reserved resources be
maintained at economically viable levels. Third, in Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its earlier interpretation of the 1855 treaties in Winans and applied
the Winters economic viability standard to protect the Tribes harvests from
extensive encroachment. Following this established Supreme Court case law,
current attempts at reconciling the decimation of the Tribes' fisheries must
131. COUNCIL IN THE WALLA WALLA VALLEY, supra note 4, at 59.
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reconsider the failure of mitigation efforts and take steps to restore river
conditions to those capable of rebuilding self-sustaining salmon populations.
A. Limiting Development that Diminishes the Tribes' Harvests
In 1905, prior to any major federal dam construction, the Supreme Court
offered its first interpretation of the 1855 fishing provisions. In United States
v. Winans, the Court relied on federal principles of treaty construction to
interpret the 1855 Treaty with the Yakima as imposing limits on federal, state,
and private development that diminished the economic viability of the tribe's
salmon harvests.' Specifically, the Court ruled that the Winans brothers'
fish wheel operations violated the treaty agreement by "excluding" the
Yakama from their fisheries.'" In the case of the fish wheels, as later with
hydropower operations, the tribe was "excluded" from both accessing their
fisheries and from obtaining an economically viable salmon harvest. Thus, in
the first Supreme Court case to interpret the 1855 fishing provisions, the
Court established precedent regarding proper treaty interpretation and set
limits on the impact development may have on the Columbia Basin Tribes'
fisheries.
Initially, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's assertion that the
1855 treaty reserved to the Indians "no rights but what any inhabitant of the
territory or state would have.""'3 Referring to the 1855 treaty council at
Walla Walla, the Court declared this interpretation was an "impotent outcome
to negotiations and a convention which seemed to promise more, and give the
word of the nation for more."" Consequently, to fulfill the intent of the
signatory' parties, the Court turned to principles of treaty construction for
guidance in its interpretation.
Early in its adjudication of federal Indian law cases, the Supreme Court
laid out ground rules for treaty construction in an attempt to ensure that the
federal government fulfilled its treaty obligations owed to Indian Nations. For
example, in Worcester v. Georgia,' the Supreme Court described the proper
course of treaty construction.3 ' The Court stated,
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be
construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of which are
susceptible of a more extended meaning than their plain import,
132. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
133. See id. at 381-82. Although Winans dealt specifically with Treaty with the Yakima,
June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, the Court's analysis of the fishing provisions is directly applicable to
the treaties with the other Columbia Basin Tribes.
134. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 382.
135. Id. at 380.
136. Id.
137. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).




as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be
considered used only in the latter sense.... How the words of
the treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than
their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction."
Following these mandated principles, the Winans Court held that the 1855
treaty should be construed as the Indians would have understood it, as justice
and reason demand to fulfill duties of care and protection, in terms of the
substance of the rights reserved, without regard for technical rules, and
consistent with the circumstances surrounding the treaty."
Accordingly, with the testimony of the Yakama plaintiffs before it, the
Court read the treaties in light of the tribe's prior use of their fisheries and
economic dependence on salmon. Relying on this history and descriptions of
the 1855 negotiations, the Court described the Yakama's salmon harvests as
"not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed."'' Yet the Court also noted that due to increasing settlement
pressures, it became necessary for the U.S. to negotiate with the tribe for land
cessions and for an accommodation of their fishing practices.' Thus,
relying on promises that the U.S. would protect their reserved land base and
fisheries, the Yakama agreed to share their fisheries "in common" with the
settlers as did the other Columbia Basin Tribes.' 3
The Supreme Court appropriately notes that this agreement "was not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them - a reservation
of those not granted."'" Consequently, the tribe retained its historic fishing
rights with a slight accommodation while granting only limited rights to the
U.S. Describing the limited rights granted to the U.S., the Court held that the
treaty "imposed a servitude upon every piece" of land acquired by the
U.S. ' This servitude, running against the U.S., the state, and their grantees,
reserved for the tribe "the right to occupy [the land] to the extent and for the
purpose mentioned."" In other words, the treaty servitude requires limiting
development to allow the Yakama to maintain its salmon based economy. As




140. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) (citing Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886) and Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)).
141. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
142. See id.
143. See discussion of treaties supra note 3.
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Following its construction of the treaty, the Supreme Court held that the
Winans brothers' fish wheels violated the 1855 treaty fishing provisions by
excluding the tribe from a principle fishery and from an economically viable
harvest.' Although it allowed that white men and Indians may use different
technologies to harvest salmon, noting the impact of the fish wheels, the Court
stated that "it does not follow that the Indians may be absolutely
excluded."'49 The Court determined that the Indians were "excluded" on two
separate grounds. First, in terms of "the common right" of taking fish, the
Court held that the settlers may not use technology which depletes the
commons to the point of "absolutely excluding" the tribe's harvest. " And
second, in terms of the fishing places, the Court found that white men may
not "construct and use a device which gives them exclusive possession.""'
Focusing on the effects of the fish wheel on the tribal fisheries, the Court held
that U.S. settlers maintained only a limited right to merely share in the
commons and may not "exclude" the Indians by severely diminishing the
viability of the tribe's salmon harvest." Significantly, the Court's holding
was not based on particular technology used by the settlers; rather, the Court
looked to the technology's impact on the tribe's ability to sustain their treaty
reserved economic resources.
In holding that the tribe had been economically excluded, the Court
affirmed the Yakama's testimony describing the effect of the Winans brothers'
fish wheels on the economic viability of their fisheries. Many witnesses
testified that they could no longer harvest salmon in significant quantities
because the fish wheels were located in their most productive fisheries, the
Wisham and See-we-pam fisheries." These locations provided the best
fishing for the Yakama because their swift current channeled the salmon near
the shore.'5 Although fish could potentially be caught from anywhere along
the river's edge,"5 the testimony continues, the Indians developed their





153. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 100, 135, United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180); Record at 52, 73, Winans (No. 180) (testifying "tihat is the chief
fishery of the Indians where Winans wheels are now," and "the Indians thought this to be the boss
of the salmon stations."). Many other Indians and whites also named the Wisham and See-we-
pam fisheries as their most productive. See also Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 108,
110, 114, 121, 127, 131, 133, 136, 141, 147, 149, 159, 175, 217; Record at 57, 58, 61, 65, 68.
71, 72, 74, 77, 80, 82, 88, 99, 126, Winans (No. 180).
154. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 105; Record at 56, Winans (No. 180)
(testifying that "[tlhere is a swift current; the current runs right close to the shore and that is the
only place they can catch fish with a net").
155. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 101; Record at 53, Winans (No. 180)
(testifying that catching fish just anywhere "would be pretty hard; there is no other place where
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss2/4
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fishing technology to be used in these narrow channels." At these locations,
a single Yakama fisherman using only a dip net could catch nearly one
hundred fish a day." However, after fish wheels were constructed in the
channel, witnesses testified that "the Indians get poor [and are having] hard
times.""' Attempting to replace their usual harvests at the Wisham and See-
we-pam fisheries, some witnesses testified that they were able to catch a few
fish above the wheels," and others stated that they fished at sites belonging
to relatives from other tribes." In addition, some Yakama survived by
harvesting salmon from some of their more limited seasonal fisheries.'61
Summarizing the problem for the Court, plaintiff Thomas Simpson stated,
"There are very few [fish] go by and the Indians can't catch them."" Thus,
without eliminating the entire catch,'" the Winans brothers' fish wheels
we could fish like that place"); Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 102; Record at 54,
Winans (No. 180) (testifying that "the treaty also gave the Indians the rights to fish all along the
Columbia River").
156. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 101; Record at 53, Winas (No. 180)
(testifying that "[t]heir way of catching that salmon there was spearing, hooking, and dipping -
a long stick and a gaft hook ... there is no other place where we could fish like that');
Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 172; Record at 97, Winans (No. 180).
157. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 157; Record at 87, Winans (No. 180)
(testifying: "Q. How many fish a day did you catch with a net there before the fish wheels was
put in? A. Good many in one day.... Q. One hundred? A. Yes"). The extent of the Yakama's
harvest was confirmed by many witnesses. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 146,
167, 178; Record at 80, 94, 101, Winans (No. 180).
158. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 150; Record at 83, Winans (No. 180).
159. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 106; Record at 56, Winans (No. 180)
(testifying: "Q. What effect did the putting of the fish wheels have on catching fish with the nets
above the wheels? A. They catch some.... Not many; some, not like they used to catch before
the fish wheels were put in."); Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 108, 120, 136, 146;
Record at 57, 64, 74, 80, Winans (No. 180).
160. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 103, 149; Record at 54, 82, Winans
(No. 180).
161. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 218; Record at 127, Winans (No. 180)
(testifying: "Q. Aren't there fisheries at White Salmon, Uttle White Salmon? A. There are at
certain times of year, fall of the year, they fish in that stream or the different streams around
there"); Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 218; Record at 127, Winans (No. 180).
162. Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 91, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905) (No. 180); Record at 47, Winans (No. 180).
163. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 360; Record at 220, Winans (No. 180)
(taking the testimony of Holister D. McGuire, State fish and game protector for the State of
Oregon: "Q. Then while it is true that only five percent of the [total yearly catch] have been
caught in the fish wheels, it is also true digt... of the fish caught in the upper part of the river
... one-half of the fish are caught with fish wheels? A. I think so; probably more. Q....
practically all the of the fish axe caught with the fish wheels, are they not? ... A. A large
percentage... of the fish are taken with wheels"); Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at
132; Record at 71, Winans (No. 180) (testifying that "of course the wheel is getting the salmon
and the nets can get a little... ").
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"excluded" the Indians by diminishing their harvests below economically
sustainable levels."6
Consequently, the Court determined that the practical and economic effects
of the fish wheels violated the 1855 Treaty with the Yakima. The Court's
holding was substantially based on its recognition of the limited rights granted
to the U.S. and its settlers. Under all of the 1855 treaties, Columbia Basin
development rights were limited by a treaty servitude intended to ensure
maintenance of the Tribes' primary economic resource. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the fish wheels violated the agreement by reducing the
Yakamas' salmon harvests below economically viable levels. As the Yakamas'
attorneys successful argued to the Winans Court, "the Indians.... can not be
shunted off to inferior places on the theory that it is a legitimate defense to
say that they will do well enough at other points."" Similarly, with
development of the dams, the responsibility for sustaining salmon populations
cannot be passed off to mitigation measures on the theory that it is a
legitimate defense to say that the Columbia Basin Tribes will do well enough
on restricted harvests of threatened or endangered species. Rather, rejecting
diminishment of tribal economic resources, the Supreme Court upheld
economic viability as an important aspect of the 1855 treaties.
B. Protecting Treaty Reserved Resources at Economically Viable Levels
Soon after the Winans decision, the Supreme Court made clear that tribal
economic viability was a central tenant in its construction of treaties and
agreements with Indian Nations. In Winters v. United States,'" settlers
upstream from the Fort Belknap Reservation constructed a dam which
depleted the tribes' irrigation waters.67 Rejecting the settlers claim that the
1888 agreement creating the reservation did not reserve irrigation water for
the Indians, the Court established an economic viability standard as the
measure of protection for treaty-reserved economic resources."6
Similar to Winans, the Court began its interpretation of the 1888 agreement
by describing the Indians full enjoyment of the region's resources prior to
164. See Testimony and Final Report of Examiner at 117; Record at 63, Winans (No. 180)
(testifying that "on account of those wheels the Indians can't get much salmon now"); Testimony
and Final Report of Examiner at 91, 126, 127, 132, 143, 173; Record at 47, 68, 69, 71, 78, 98,
Winans (No. 180).
165. Brief for Appellants at 17, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180).
166. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
167. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 804-09 (2nd ed. 1991). The Winters doctrine is noted for furthering the reserved
rights of Indian Nations into the area of water law. In the western U.S. most water allocation is
determined by the prior appropriation doctrine, giving priority to the first water users of a
particular source. Recognizing Indian Nations' reservation of water resources by treaty, or in this
case an agreement, the Winters doctrine sets the appropriation date at the creation of the
reservation, superior to later appropriators.
168. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 565, 576.
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white settlement."s The Court noted that under pressures of non-Indian
settlement the tribes agreed with the U.S. to reserve and occupy a smaller
land base from which they would "become self-supporting, as a pastoral and
agricultural people .. ...,7' However, to "undertake the cultivation of soil,
or engage in pastorial [sic] pursuits, as a means of obtaining a livelihood,"''
as the U.S. encouraged, the Court found that it was necessary for the tribes
to irrigate their arid lands with water from the Milk River which bordered the
reservation." Without irrigation waters the tribes' treaty reservations would
be valueless."
To secure the tribes' reserved irrigation water and uphold the "declared
purpose" of the agreement,74 the Court again relied on principles of treaty
construction, holding that
by a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the
Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the
standpoint of the Indians. And the rule should certainly be
applied to determine between two inferences, one of which
would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair
or defeat it.75
Thus, contrary to the settlers' claims, the Winters Court found that the Gros
Ventre and Assinibonie Tribes did not cede their extensive land base without
reserving the resources needed to economically sustain themselves. 76
Consequently, by constructing substantial dams and reservoirs upstream from
the tribes' water diversions in 1900,'" the settlers violated the reservations
made in the 1888 agreement.
Essential to the Winters Court's finding that the 1888 agreement reserved
water for agricultural irrigation was its identification of the tribes' economic
viability as a "prominent and significant" element of the agreement."
Similar to the 1855 Stevens treaties which secure salmon harvests for the
economic livelihood of the Columbia Basin Tribes, the Court recognized that
a central purpose of the 1888 agreement were enough water resources to
169. See id.
170. Brief for the United States at 15, United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (No.
499) (quoting the preamble to the 1888 agreement at 25 Stat. 113 (1888)); see also Winters, 207
U.S. at 576.
171. Brief for the United States at 15, United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (No.
499) (quoting Article V of the 1888 agreement at 25 Stat. 113 (1888)).
172. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 566.
173. Id. at 576.
174. Id. at 577.
175. Id. at 576-77.
176. See id. at 576.
177. See id. at 567.
178. Id. at 575-76.
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promote agriculture on the Fort Belknap Reservation."' Struck by the
audacity of the settler's attempt to read the agreement as not providing for
the tribes' economic survival,'80 the Court stated that "[ihe lands were arid,
and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. And yet, it is contended,
the means of irrigation were deliberately given up by the Indians and
deliberately accepted by the government."''
Rejecting this assertion, the Winters Court enforced the 1888 agreement
as securing the resources necessary to promote reservation's economic
viability. The Court asked, "Did [the Indians] reduce their area of occupation
and give up the water which made it valuable?"'" No, the Court concluded,
"[lit would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the
reservation and took from the Indians the consideration of their grant,
leaving them a barren waste, . . ."" Instead, finding that a central purpose
of treaties and agreements is to provide for a tribe's economic welfare, the
Supreme Court used the 1888 agreements to promote the economic viability
of the tribes.
The economic viability standard enforced by the Winters Court was
subsequently affirmed in Arizona v. California,'" one of the United State's
longest running water law disputes. In the Arizona litigation, which stemmed
from a 1928 Act attempting to settle the apportionment of the Colorado
River,"rs the Supreme Court again protected tribal reservations of water at
economically viable levels. First, relying on the reserved rights doctrine of
Winans and Winters, the Court determined that the congressional acts and
Executive Orders establishing the reservations in question also reserved
irrigation waters for the Indians' economic use." Second, rejecting the
State of Arizona's argument that water be allocated according to the
"foreseeable needs" of the Indians currently living on the reservation,"n the
Court required that enough water be reserved to ensure the economic
viability of the land reserved for the tribes. Thus, the Court held that to
fulfill the purpose of the reservations, an allocation based on the practicably
179. See Brief for the United States at 15, United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
(No. 499) (quoting the preamble to the 1888 agreement at 25 Stat. 113 (1888)); Winters, 207 U.S.
at 576.
180. See Brief for the Appellants at 26-27, United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
(No. 499).
181. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
182. Ud.
183. Id. at 577.
184. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
185. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALs 701-29 (2nd ed. 1991).
186. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 598-601.




irrigable acreage (PIA) of each reservation would provide for the tribes'
economic welfare."
Contrary to calculations based on individual Indians' foreseeable needs,
the PIA standard follows Winters by ensuring that the land reserved by the
tribes would be economically viable.'" Although the PIA standard
ultimately limits tribal allocation of a resource once completely enjoyed by
the tribes and never ceded to the U.S., it significantly demonstrates the
Supreme Court's continued enforcement of U.S. obligations to secure treaty
reserved economic resources at economically viable levels. Thus, in a time
of diminishing natural resources, the Winters and Arizona cases followed the
discussion of economic encroachment begun in Winans to establish a
standard for protecting treaty reserved economic resources.
C. Requiring Economically Viable Salmon Harvests
In the most recent Supreme Court case to interpret the 1855 treaties,
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n,'" the Court followed Winans, Winters, and Arizona to find that the
Tribes reserved economically viable salmon harvests.'9' Although the dams
had yet to deplete the remaining salmon stocks, over-fishing and
discriminatory state regulations favoring non-Indians pressured the Court to
determine "the character of [the] treaty right to takefish."'' This litigation
originally began with two highly charged cases in the 1960s and 1970s that
attempted to apportion the salmon harvests between Indians and non-Indians.
In the first case, Sohappy v. Smith," the federal district court in Oregon
interpreted the treaties as providing the Tribes with a right to a "fair share"
of the annual salmon harvests." Later, following the "fair share" principle,
Judge Boldt, in United States v. Washington,'95 interpreted the 1855 treaty
language, "in common with," to mean a 50150 division between treaty and
nontreaty salmon fisherman." However, because of widespread defiance
of these rulings and continued discriminatory state practices, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the meaning of the 1855 treaty
fishing provisions."
188. See id. at 598-601.
189. See id. at 600-01.
190. 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (litigating similar fishing provisions contained in treaties with
coastal Washington tribes as well as the Columbia Basin Tribes); see, e.g., Treaty of Point Elliott,
Jan. 27, 1855, 12 Stat. 927.
191. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685-86.
192. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 662 (emphasis added).
193. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
194. See id. at 910.
195. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
196. See id. at 342.
197. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 674.
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First, characterizing treaties with Indian Nations as essentially a contract
between two sovereign nations, the Court attempted to view the "contract"
as the Tribes would have understood it at the time of its execution.'98
Following this long standing principle of federal Indian law, the Court
described the Tribes' reliance on salmon and determined that the fishing
provisions were essential to the completion of the 1855 treaties."w In sum,
the Court stated that, "it is ... inconceivable that either party deliberately
agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful
use of their accustomed places to fish."''a Moreover, because of the
predictability and size of salmon runs, the Court also held that the treaties
reserved the Indians' right to "take" salmon, as opposed to the mere
opportunity to attempt to catch some fish."' Thus, the Court determined
that the 1855 treaties "unambiguously ... secure the Indians' right to take
a share of each run of fish that passes through tribal fishing areas. '
Second, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's fifty-fifty
apportionment of salmon harvests between Indians and non-Indians as
consistent with its cases protecting treaty-reserved economic resources.' 3
Relying on Winans, Winters, and Arizona, the Court approved of this
apportionment because it "assured that the Indians' reasonable livelihood
needs would be met."' The Court maintained that diminishing or
eliminating the economic value of the Indians' treaty reserved resources
violated the central purpose of treaties and agreements with Indian
Nations.'
Third, focusing on the economic impact to the Tribes' treaty reserved
economic resources, the Court described the Tribes' treaty allocation of the
harvest as one that provides the Tribes with a "moderate living.""a
Although a "moderate living" standard establishes a high level of protection
for the Tribes' economic resources, like the PIA standard, the Court's
standard could impose a limitation on tribal fishing that was never agreed to
by the Tribes or intended when the "contract" was written in 1855.'
Nevertheless, the economic implications of a moderate living standard go a
198. See id. at 675.
199. see id at 663-70, 675-76.
200. Id. at 676.
201. See id at 679.
202. Id (finding that this issue "is virtually a 'matter decided' by our previous holdings").
203. See id at 685-86.
204. ?d at 685.
205. See id at 685-86.
206. Id at 686.
207. See Peter C. Monson, United States v. Washington (Phase 11): The Indian Fishing
Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENvTL. L. 469, 491 (1982) (concluding that the "moderate living"
standard is contrary to principles of treaty construction and United States' trust obligations to the
Tribes, and noting that the standard was probably only intended to be invoked if the Tribes




long way to support the Tribes' 1855 treaty reservations. For example, in
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin,' the court determined that even by harvesting all the resources
in the treaty area, the tribal members' income would not reach, let alone
exceed, a moderate living standard. Likewise, to exceed a moderate
living standard, the Columbia Basin Tribes would need to sustain salmon
harvests similar to their historic catch.
While the issue before the Court in Fishing Vessel only addressed
allocation of the salmon harvests between treaty and nontreaty fishermen, the
Court's characterization of the treaty right applies with equal force to the
effects of the Columbia Basin dams on the Tribes' fisheries."' Whether the
resource is diminished by non-Indian over-fishing or by dam development,
the Court explicitly held that the Indians may not be denied "any meaningful
use of their accustomed places to fish."2"1 The Court continued that such
a diminished "right" is "totally foreign to the spirit of the negotiations" and
"would hardly have been sufficient to compensate [the Tribes] for the
millions of acres they ceded to the Territory."2 '2 Further, specifically
affirming the removal of development which threatens the Tribes fisheries,
the Court summarized the Winans holding as "clearly includ[ing] removal of
enough of the fishing wheels to enable some fish to escape and be available
to Indian fishermen upstream."
213
Fishing Vessel, and its preceding cases, demonstrate the Court's use of an
economically viable standard to protect treaty reserved economic resources
against extensive encroachment. In these cases, the Court's rulings were
based on a particular action's impact on the treaty resource, not the action
208. 686 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
209. See id. at 227-31.
210. "Phase II" of the United States v. Washington litigation dealt directly with the
environmental implications of the Tribes' treaty reservations. See United States v. Washington,
506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980). The district court found that "[t]he most fundamental
prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken" and that
"implicitly incorporated in the treaties' fishing clause is the right to have the fishery habitat
protected from man-made despoliation." Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the lower
cours declaratory judgment which created an environmental servitude on the State of
Washington. See United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1389 (9th Cir. 1982). However,
the court did recognize that "the treaty places environmental restraints on the activities in the case
area." Id. at 1381. Upon en banc review, the full Ninth Circuit modified this earlier decision to
find that ruling on the environmental issue "is contrary to the exercise of sound judicial discretion
... in the absence of concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case." United States
v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (1985). Thus, as current river conditions have produced
.concrete facts" of a "dispute" between the Tribes' fisheries and hydropower development, the
Phase II litigation supports diminishing development to secure the Tribes 1855 treaty reservations.
211. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 676 (1979).
212. Id. at 677-78.
213. Id. at 681.
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itself. Whether it is a fish wheel, an irrigation ditch, over-fishing,
discriminatory regulations, or a series of dams, the Court's analysis simply
looks to the effect of the encroachment on the resource. Thus, because
damming the Columbia Basin has diminished the Tribes' harvest below
economically viable levels, the dams violate the 1855 treaty provisions. To
remedy this violation, the U.S. must reduce its development and restore
salmon habitat capable of sustaining viable salmon populations.
V. The Columbia Basin Dams Limit Salmon Viability and Sustainability
You have not witnessed the extinction of the Snake River Coho
run. You have witnessed the final success of the eradication
program of the Snake River Coho run .... 214
Damning the Columbia and Snake Rivers to provide hydropower, irrigation,
and navigation to the Pacific Northwest is the principle cause of declining
salmon ropulations. National Marine Fish Service (NMFS) estimated that the
development and operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System
(FCRPS) is responsible for 80% of salmon losses since historical runs.2 Prior
to dam construction, the basin supported 10 to 16 million salmon from which
the Tribes harvested approximately 5 million fish.2 6 Subsequently, fifty-nine
Columbia Basin salmon stocks have passed into extinction,"' and the total
population has declined by over 90%."' In 1998, the Tribes harvested 48,500
fall chinook and 13,000 steelhead, or a little more than 10% of their former
catch.2 9 Of all the runs relied on by the Tribes for their economic welfare, the
Hanford Reach stock of fall chinook is the Tribes' only remaining commercial
fishery. The Tribes have estimated their economic losses from the decimation
of salmon populations in the billions of dollars.'
214. JOSEPH CONE, A COMMON FATE: ENDANGERED SALMON AND PEOPLE OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHWFST 38 (1995).
215. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEPot OF COMMERCE, ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT-SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION, REINITIATION OF
CONSULTATION ON 1994-1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM
AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM IN 1995 AND FUTURE YEARS 4 (1995) [hereinafter
1995 BIOP].
216. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON
SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 74 (1986).
217. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. DEP'r OF COMMERCE, PROPOSED
RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON 1-2 (1995) [hereinafter NMFS PROPOSED RECOVERY
PLAN].
218. Siee SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-1.
219. See Paul Lumley & Mike Matylewich, Fall Fishery Blues, WANA CHINOOK TYMOO,
Winter 1999, at 18.




To comply with the 1855 treaties, the U.S. must end its decades of status quo
management and begin providing the habitat required to rebuild viable salmon
populations. Dam construction along the Columbia and Snake Rivers decimated
the Basin's salmon populations by reducing both the quantity and quality of
salmon habitat, degrading water quality, and directly killing migrating
salmon."' None of these impacts can be overcome by the mitigation efforts
pursued by U.S. agencies governing the FCRPS. Rather, this failed mitigation
policy perpetuated the decline of salmon runs and caused additional salmon
mortality. Similarly, recovery efforts under the ESA z  have merely preserved
the status quo and failed to account for U.S. treaty obligations to the Columbia
Basin Tribes. Recovering salmon populations to levels reserved by the 1855
treaties requires that salmon habitat be restored through dam removal. Nearly
every study on salmon recovery in the Columbia Basin concludes that breaching
some of the dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers is the only recovery
method capable of rebuilding salmon populations to self-sustaining harvestable
levels, as required by the treaties.
A. Impacts of the Dams on Salmon Habitat and Populations
The most devastating impact on the Tribes' once sustainable fisheries is the
elimination, degradation, and isolation of alluvial salmon habitat by the
Columbia Basin hydropower system.' While salmon spend approximately
two to four years in the oceanm the most critical phases of salmon life
histories take place in their freshwater habitat. In the freshwater Columbia
Basin, female salmon deposit their eggs in gravel stream and lake bottoms,
males fertilize the eggs, hatchlings rear and feed in their nursery streams, and
juvenile salmon grow, rest, and undergo smoltification while migrating to the
ocean. Diminishing the quantity and quality of this habitat results in fewer eggs
being deposited and fertilized successfully, more competition among juveniles
for food and protective habitat, increased predation, inhibited juvenile
221. See generally THE INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC GROUP, RETURN TO THE RIVER:
RESTORATION OF SALMONID FISHES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER ECOSYSTEM xvii-xviii (1996)
[hereinafter RETURN TO THE RIVER]; SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-1 to 3-29.
222. See Endangered Species Act §§ 2 to 5, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 to 1534 (1998).
223. The Columbia Basin watershed encompasses approximately 259,000 square mites in
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and British Columbia. Each component of this watershed
potentially provides essential habitat functions for the life cycle of threatened and endangered
salmon. For example, Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook utilize a variety of habitats,
beginning their lives emerging from the gravel streambeds of subbasins spread across Washington
and Idaho. After rearing in their nursery streams for about a year, the smolts begin migrating
seaward from April until May. High spring flows assist the smolts in their migration, but smolts
also pause along the way to grow, rest and feed. Reaching the mouth of the Columbia,
spring/summer chinook inhabit nearshore areas before traveling throughout the northeast Pacific
Ocean. Two to three years later, adult chinook return to the Columbia migrating back to their
gravel streambeds where they spawn and then die. See 1995 BiOP, supra note 215, at 18-19.
224. See NMFS PROPOsED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 217, at 11-2.
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development, and fewer salmon reaching the mouth of the Columbia alive or
properly developed for their ocean habitat. Without appropriate habitat to
complete these developmental stages in the salmon life cycle, dams will
continue to limit the productivity of the Tribes' fisheries.
In some cases, high head dams without fish passage facilities simply block
access to abundant upstream habitats. At one time, salmon populations utilized
approximately 13,000 miles of Columbia Basin rivers and streams.'m
However, since the mid-twentieth century, three dams on the Columbia, Snake,
and Clearwater rivers have eliminated more than half of the historical mainstem
and tributary habitat in the Columbia Basin.' Eliminating these habitats
caused the extinction of some runs, increased competition among remaining
runs, and diminished the genetic variability of salmon stocks.
On the Columbia River, Chief Joseph Dam blocks access to 1,100 miles of
mainstemn habitat.' While on the Snake River, Hells Canyon Dam blocks
access to another 600 miles of mainstem habitat.' Although mainstem
conditions above these two dams may be degraded by other projects, it is likely
that suitable tributary habitat exists which would attract additional spawning
populationsm  For example, Dworshak Dam, on the Clearwater River in
Idaho, blocks access to high quality spawning habitat in the Clearwater National
Forest. Although many national forests have been subject to extensive logging
which can damage salmon habitat,?" the forests of northern Idaho would offer
some of the most remote and undeveloped areas available for salmon habitat.
Providing such high quality spawning habitat, and protecting it from further
development, has been identified by NMFS as an important step in salmon
recovery. m Thus, by removing one or more of these dams, particularly
Dworshak Dam, the U.S. could substantially increase valuable spawning habitat
and ease population pressures in degraded areas.
More important for rebuilding existing salmon populations, however, are the
habitat conditions in the accessible portions of the Columbia Basin. By
degrading the quality of existing salmon habitat, the dams directly limit the
viability of surviving salmon populations. Of particular importance are the
devastating conditions created by the eight federal dams which begin at the
mouth of the Columbia and extend along the lower Snake River into Idaho."
225. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-14.
226. See id at 3-20.
227. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 113, 161.
228. See SPtRrr OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-20.
229. See id
230. See RETURN TO THE RIvER, supra note 221, at 134 (noting that salmon seek out high
quality habitat for spawning and sometimes stray from their traditional spawning grounds).
231. See id at 141-43.
232. See NMFS PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 217, at V-I-6 to V-1-67 (calling
for a reduction in land use activities that degrade salmon habitat and protecting remaining high
quality riparian habitats).




These dams, some or all of which must be passed by threatened and endangered
salmon migrating in and out of the Columbia Basin, degraded approximately
400 miles of mainstem alluvial salmon habitat by creating a series of tepid lakes
whose waters back up from one dam to the next.
Whether spawning or migrating in the mainstem lower Columbia and Snake
Rivers, endangered salmon are adversely impacted by these eight dams.
Regulating the flow of the lower Columbia and Snake Rivers, the dams limit
habitat functions and create lethal conditions for salmon. The regulated rivers
provide homogeneous, high temperature lacustrine habitat, contain high levels
of fine sediments, dissolved gases and pollutants, and lack riparian vegetation
and food resources.'
Conversely, salmon require cool, unpolluted alluvial habitat with a stable and
permeable gravel substrate." The rise and fall of such unregulated rivers
provide juvenile salmon with complex floodplains for rearing, feeding, and
resting during downstream migration. These diverse floodplain habitats
furnish vegetative cover, a steady supply of insects and small food particles,
quiet-water areas, backwaters, small spring-fed channels, floodplain ponds and
slouths, and alcoves created by woody debris z' In addition, adult salmon
returning to spawn require deep resting pools, riparian forest canopy, undercut
banks, and accumulations of large woody debris in the proximity of spawning
habitats. ' This cover and habitat complexity provides adult salmon with
shelter during high flow events and refuge during low flows as they complete
the spawning process.' As in the outright elimination of salmon habitat, the
degradation of salmon habitat impacts juvenile and adult salmon during essential
phases of their life histories.
The escalating impacts of habitat degradation on the viability of remaining
salmon populations is demonstrated by the current configuration of the eight
federal dams on the lower Columbia and Snake Rivers. Of the remaining
mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers only two portions still provide alluvial
salmon habitat: the Hanford Reach on the mid-Columbia and a segment of the
Snake River below the Hells Canyon Complex."4 While both of these areas
are home to core populations of fall chinook, the dams threaten one population
(1957), John Day (1968), McNary (1953), Ice Harbor (1961), Lower Monumental (1969), Little
Goose (1970), and Lower Granite (1975).
234. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 22,211; SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra
note 2, at 3-25, 3-28.
235. See RETURN TO THE RIvER, supra note 221, at 131; SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note
2, at 3-14.
236. See RETURN TO THE RIvER, supra note 221, at 130, 132.
237. See id at 49, 132.
238. See id. at 135.
239. See id.
240. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-22.
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and not the other.2 4' To reach the Pacific Ocean from their Hanford Reach
habitat, fall chinook are only required to negotiate the four dams and reservoirs
on the lower Columbia. On the other hand, Snake River fall chinook must
contend with an additional four dams and reservoirs on the lower Snake River
before entering the Columbia where they then encounter the four dams on the
lower Columbia River. Not surprisingly, the free-flowing Hanford Reach is
home to the largest naturally spawning population of chinook salmon above
Bonneville Dam and remains stable while Snake River fall chinook have been
listed as a threatened species under the ESA. '
The contrasting viability of these stocks also provides two important lessons
regarding the effects of habitat degradation in the mainstem Columbia and
Snake Rivers. Since developers substantially degraded mainstem conditions, its
has been convenient for the federal government to assume that most spawning
and juvenile growth takes place in tributaries, and to treat the mainstem rivers
as nothing more than a migration corridor to the ocean. In fact, many salmon
mitigation and recovery efforts follow this model.' However, the Hanford
Reach md Snake River fall chinook populations demonstrate that mainstem
habitat is important for juvenile development and as spawning grounds for core
populations which maintain overall salmon survival.
First, contrary to a linear model of downstream migration, the Independent
Scientific Group (ISG), contracted by the NPPC to review its salmon recovery
plans,' concluded that juveniles follow a "discontinuous spiraling" pattern of
downstream migration.' Thus, in the free-flowing Hanford Reach, migrating
juveniles are able to spiral downstream utilizing the main river channel and its
well developed shoreline. In the Hanford Reach, the diverse shoreline provides
riparian vegetation and flooded cobble beaches which contain abundant insect
food, as well as pools of calmer waters for resting.' Conversely, while
rearing in free-flowing waters, Snake River fall chinook soon face the waters
backed up behind Lower Granite Dam. In this lacustrine habitat, Snake River
fall chinook spiral toward barren reservoir shorelines characterized by eroding
soil banks or rock rip-rap, neither of which provide appropriate food
241. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 211.
242. See id. at xvii, xx, 211; see also Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer
Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653
(1992).
243. See discussion infra Part V.B (discussing mitigation efforts that do not account for
juvenile use of the mainstem habitat and merely transport or flush salmon down the mainstem
rivers to the mouth of the Columbia River).
244. Specifically, the ISG was contracted to review the NPPC's Fish and Wildlife Program
authorized by the Northwest Power Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1998), and to recommend a
scientific conceptual foundation for future Fish and Wildlife Programs. See discussion infra Part
V.D.
245. RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 198, 202.
246. See id at21.
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resources. 7 Further, in May and June, the unvegetated reservoir shoreline
waters quickly warm forcing Snake River juveniles into pelagic waters where
their preferred food is scarce.u Under these conditions, Snake River fall
chinook begin their 471 mile migration with barely enough food to account for
their basal metabolism, while Hanford Reach salmon are more developed.'s
Thus, by degrading mainstem conditions the dams eliminate important habitat
for juvenile development.
Second, the very existence of these stocks indicate that the mainstem rivers
potentially offer substantial spawning habitat. Contrary to the perception of the
mainstem rivers as simply a migration corridor, the mainstem Columbia and
Snake Rivers once provided extensive spawning grounds for core populations
of fall chinook.' However, by degrading the quality of mainstem spawning
habitat, the dams threaten both mainstem and tributary populations. Populations
spawning in the mainstem rivers were less susceptible to seasonal droughts or
other events disturbing local river conditions2' Consequently, in the event of
local extinctions or depressed populations, mainstem salmon with similar
genetics could replenish local populations preserving the overall viability of the
salmon stock.' Therefore, by threatening the existence of mainstem Snake
River fall chinook, the dams threaten a core population that is essential to
maintaining the viability of the stock. Conversely, because of their flourishing
core population, the Columbia River fall chinook stock is more stable. Given
the essential functions of mainstem habitat, recovery efforts are needed which
focus on recovering the degraded mainstem lower Columbia and Snake Rivers.
Similar to the effects of declining core populations, the dams' isolation of
spawning habitat creates conditions which threaten the long term sustainability
of remaining salmon stocks. Recent scientific studies conclude that salmon
stocks are most appropriately viewed as metapopulations.' Metapopulations
are spatially defined groups of local populations which are linked by dispersal
of individuals.' Isolating salmon habitat, particularly spawning and rearing
grounds, fragments the metapopulation structure and results in isolated salmon
populations. Isolating populations reduces the stock's overall genetic diversity,
while limiting the ability of salmon to breed across local populations. 5 In
addition, isolated populations are more likely to pass into extinction because of
degraded conditions or a local event. Finally, isolated habitats are less likely
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id at 211-12.
250. See id. at 79.
251. See id
252. See id. at 77.
253. See id. at 76-78.
254. See id.
255. See id at 80.
256. See id. at 80-82.
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to be refounded by straying salmon, making local extinctions permanent and
driving the entire metapopulation incrementally toward extinction."
Another impact of the dams significantly affecting salmon habitat and
population viability is the degradation of Columbia Basin water quality. The
most threatening change in water quality has been an increase in water
temperatures. Creating slow moving reservoirs spanning hundreds of miles,
the dams increase solar heating producing lethal conditions for salmon in the
spring and summer. In addition, facilitating the irrigation of nearly three
million acres of ard lands, the dams increase in-river temperatures by diverting
incredible amounts of water away from the rivers.' In all phases of their life
cycle salmon prefer water temperatures between 50°F and 590F. 1 However,
August temperatures exceeding 70°F are common in the mainstem Columbia
River below Chief Joseph Dam, throughout the Snake River, and in many
tributary basins.a Again affecting critical phases of the salmon life cycle, the
temperatures of the developed Columbia Basin can easily exceed those tolerable
to incubating eggs which die at 60 °F.' Moreover, mid-sixties temperatures
can stwss adult and juvenile salmon, further diminishing their ability to migrate
or perform reproductive functions.n
The dams also degrade water quality by producing high concentrations of
dissolved gases. During periods of high flow, or as a mitigation measure, water
is released through dam spillways. Water released through spillway gates at the
tops of the dams falls into pools where water pressure forces entrained air
bubbles into solution.! These dissolved gases supersaturate the water until
equilibrium can be achieved downstream from the dams by gas exchange with
the atmosphere!' In fast moving rivers, such as below a naturally occurring
wateffadl, gases are quickly released. However, in the slow moving
257. See id. at 82. This event is known as an "extinction vortex" and requires significant
changes to reverse population trends. An "extinction vortex" is particularly threatening to species
survival because the processes driving population declines are reinforced as the population
diminishes. Consequently, in addition to mortalities from the dams, the path toward extinction
pulls the population ever closer to permanent extinction.
258. Preliminary assessment of water quality under the Clean Water Act shows that
Columbia and Snake River water temperatures are primarily limited by the dams. See Barry
Espenson, Study: Dams Show biggest Impact on Water Temps, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL. (Dec.
4, 1998) <http'//www.nwppc.orgfbulletinlbull_24.htm#8>.
259. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-25; RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note
221, at 169, 172.
260. See MIGHErTo & EBEL, supra note 14, at 64; RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221,
at 145.
261. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 171.
262. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-25.
263. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 171.
264. See id. at 171.
265. See id. at 315; MIGHETTO & EBEL, supra note 14. at 89.
266. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 315.




reservoirs, which span the lower Columbia and Snake Rivers, the gases are
never entirely purged from the water.' Salmon absorb these dissolved gases
which can erupt in their bloodstream, cause blistered scales, or disrupt gill and
fin functions!' This damage can be lethal, or sufficiently debilitate salmon
leading to additional deaths from predation, infection, or insufficient growth and
development' 0 While improved control over high flow events diminished
mortalities from gas supersaturation from 70% in 1971"' to around 2 %,2'
using spill as a mitigation measure reintroduces the threat of increased gas
supersaturation mortalities.'
Finally, eliminating wetlands and floodplains, and limiting river hydrology,
the dams degrade water quality by increasing the amount of pollutants, silt, and
sediments found in Columbia Basin waters. Although these degrading elements
derive from surrounding land use practices, such as logging, mining, road
building, industrial activities, and agriculture, the dams intensify the negative
impact of these activities by diminishing ecological processes that maintain
water quality. 4 Creating homogenous landscapes which lack water cleansing
wetlands and alluvial functions, the dams store this runoff in their stagnant
reservoirs. Recovering salmon from their depressed levels, requires restoration
of essential habitat characteristics and functions that promote salmon viability.
Unlike any mitigation measure, dam removal would allow for reestablishment
of appropriate salmon habitat and recover salmon populations to fulfill U.S.
treaty obligations to the Columbia Basin Tribes.
Finally, the dams are also responsible for the direct mortality of 15%-30%
of the juveniles and 5%-10% of the adults attempting to migrate through each
project." NFMS estimates that the cumulative mortality for Snake River
spring/summer chinook juveniles, who must pass eight mainstem projects to
reach the ocean, is as high as 91%Y The majority of salmon mortality occurs
in dam turbines by subjecting fish to sudden increases in water pressure or from
striking the turbine bladesPm Juveniles can enter turbines while passing
through a dam, and sometimes adults fall back into the turbines after navigating
up fish ladders. Although mitigation measures attempt to reduce turbine
mortality, screens and diversions are often found in poor condition, oversized,
268. See id.
269. See id.; RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 315.
270. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 316.
271. See MIGHETro & EBEL, supra note 14, at 89.
272. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 315.
273. See 1d. at 316-23.
274. See id. at 354-55.
275. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-28.
276. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 5.
277. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, LOWER SNAKE RIVER JUVENILE SALMON
MIGRATION FEASIBILrrY STUDY - INTERIM STATUS REPORT, 4-2 to 4-3 (December 1996)
[hereinafter INTERIM STATUS REPORT]; RETIURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 280-81.
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or entirely absent.' Thus, as technological mitigation can not provide salmon
habitat, it also provides only limited protection from mortality caused by the
dams themselves.
B. Failed Mitigation Attempts
The United States policy of mitigating dam impacts is incapable of
sustaining, let alone recovering, viable salmon populations. Quite simply, even
if direct mortality from the dams could be prevented, no amount of mitigation
measures can compensate for the overwhelming degradation of nearly every
salmon habitat in the Columbia Basin. Mitigation, in all its forms, cannot
provide salmon with their most basic habitat requirements: cool, free-flowing
rivers, gravel beds, and insect rich vegetative shorelines. Thus, by focusing on
mitigation, as opposed to appropriately restraining development, the U.S. has
never addressed the most significant cause of salmon declines, degradation of
their habitat
Rather, through the Army Corps, the United States' narrow mitigation policy
focuses on increasing migration times and reducing mortality of juvenile
migrants as they negotiate the lower Columbia and Snake Rivers. Effectively
removing the fish from the rivers, the Corps relies heavily on transporting
juveniles around the dams. For salmon that are not herded onto barges or
trucks, the Corps commits millions of dollars to spilling the fish over the dams
or flushing salmon through the system. Yet, each of these measures ignore the
important habitat functions of the mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers.
Finally, because none of these efforts can sustain wild salmon, the Corps
compensates for salmon mortality by artificial propagation. Although mitigation
efforts invariably create their own sources of mortality, NMFS continues to
support these efforts without committing to significant changes in the current
system. Thus, despite recent annual investments of $200 million,2" these
intensive, yet ineffective mitigation measures have not stemmed the precipitous
decline of salmon populations.
The centerpiece of the U.S. mitigation policy is a program of trucking and
barging salmon around the dams. Operational since 1971, the Army Corps
transports as many as fifteen million to twenty million juvenile salmon a
year. This program was supported and furthered in 1985, after a NMFS
biologist comprehensively reviewed the available research on the transportation
program. He concluded that, "[Tihe current transportation program is in a
273. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 3-20.
279. In contrast, restoring normative river conditions through dam removal would cost
approximately $75 to $153 million a year, depending on how soon the Army Corps began
removing the dams. See HARZA NORTHWEST, INC., FINAL REPORT: SALMON DECISION
ANALYSIS: LOWER SNAKE RIVER FEASIBILITY STUDY 1-10, 1-14 (1996) [hereinafter HARZA
REPORT].




position to provide fisheries managers a productive enhancement tool for the
restoration of the Columbia River salmon .... ", Subsequently, as salmon
populations became ever more threatened by river conditions, up 100% of the
fish collected at some dams are transported. Observing these efforts, the
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission noted that, "Wheat used to be
transported on land and the fish were in the river, now wheat is moved on the
river, and young fish are transported on roads."'
Transportation takes places at the three upstream dams on the lower Snake
River, and McNary Dam on the Columbia. Entering the dams, transported
salmon are diverted away from the turbines and into collection facilities by
"extended-length bar screens."' Recently installed, these screens are 20 feet
longer than the "submerged traveling screens" used since the mid-1970s.'
Although extended screens appear to increase guidance efficiency by 10 to 15%,
the amount of threatened Snake River chinook salmon passing into the turbine
chambers and not "benefiting" from the United States' primary mitigation effort
is still as high as 50% to 70%. Moreover, to work effectively, the extended
screens require cleaning brushes that sweep up and down their wedgewire face,
additional vertical barrier screens to prevent diverted fish from swimming back
into the turbines, and flow vanes to smoothly direct water and fish up the gate
slots.
If a fish makes it to the collection area, juvenile salmon are separated from
adults, resident fish, debris, and routed either directly onto a barge for transport
or into raceways where they are held for later transport by truck or barge.'
During peak migration times barges are used to haul as many as 50,000 pounds
of juvenile salmon, while trucks are used to transport smaller loads at the
beginning and end of each season. Each of these vehicles is equipped with
devices intended to reduce the stress of artificial migration.' If they survive
this journey, transported fish are delivered to the estuary at the mouth of the
Columbia a day or two later, and several weeks ahead of their normal
migrations."'
281. MIGHEro & EBEL, supra note 14, at 123.
282. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 110.
283. MIGHEITO & EBEL, supra note 14, at 174 (quoting Dam Operators Fight Increased
Spills, CRITFC NEws, Oct. 1985-Feb. 1986, at 8).
284. INTERIM STATUs REPORT, supra note 277, at 4-2.
285. Id. at 4-4.
286. See id. at 4-7; SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-26.
287. See INTERIM STATUS REPORT, supra note 277, at 4-4 to 4-7.
288. See id at 4-2.
289. See id.
290. The barges include a system to circulate river water that can be closed in case of poor
water quality in the river, degassing equipment, and compartments to separate the large and small
fish. The trucks are equipped with recirculating systems, aerators, and compartments for large and
small fish. See MIGHETo & EBEL, supra note 14, at 122.
291. See HARZA REPORT, supra note 279, at 3-7 (reporting a two-day barge trip);
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Despite substantially investing in the research, development, and daily
operation of this transport program, after thirty years of operation, the
program has failed to sustain salmon populations, and comes nowhere close
to promoting their recovery.'m Figure 2 shows the continuing populations
declines, while the number of salmon transported around the dams has
increased. ' Indeed, in all of the transportation experiments conducted from
1968-1990, transportation was only able to improve survival about half of the
time.' Moreover, because the transportation program has never been
evaluated against conditions that would maximize in-river survival,
transportation benefits may be inflated.'"
Scientific assessment of the transportation program points to additional
shortcomings. Although the program boasts a low 0.3% to 6.3% observed
MIGHETTO & EBEL, supra note 14, at 122 (reporting a sixteen-hour barge trip).
292. See RETURN TO THE RIVEa, supra note 221, at 328; see also MIOHEIrO & EBEL, supra
note 14, at 119-28 (chronicling the Army Corps' numerous and varied activities developing the
transportation program).
293. See SPIRIT OF TM SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-26 fig.5B.4.
294. See RETURN To TH RmWR, supra note 221, at 326.
295. Although NMFS seems determined to test the transportation program against improv
ed in-river conditions, i.e. increased flow, the water to substantially increase flows has never been
produced. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 111; Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon:
The Evolution of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653,
665-66 (1997) [hereinafterAmphibious Salmon] (noting that environmentalists were critical of the




mortality rate,' there is considerable debate about the overall effectiveness
of transportation and, more importantly, its long term effects.' First,
positive responses to transportation are most likely a function of river flow,
as opposed to the effectiveness of the transportation program.' Studies on
adult return rates show that during low flow years, with low return rates for
all salmon, more transported salmon return than untransported.' However,
in high flow years, with high return rates for all salmon, untransported fish
return in equal or higher numbers than transported fish."' Thus, the
transportation program alone is insufficient to improve overall survivals, and
is unnecessary in some years."'
In addition, affecting the long term viability of salmon, the transportation
program selects against certain species types and life histories as well as
contributing to delayed mortality. Because different species and stocks
of salmon migrate at different ages, and utilize different parts of the water
column, some salmon are more likely to be transported and survive
transportation. At the collection stage, steelhead and older fish are more
likely to be successfully diverted away from the turbines and subyearlings
are more likely to end up in the turbine chambers where mortality is
greatest. -"3 Next, for those subyearlings "fortunate" enough to be diverted
into collection and transportation facilities, they face higher rates of stress
related mortalities than older yearlings. For example, transported
subyearlings suffer more from high temperatures in the screen bypass
systems and crowded conditions in the transport vehicles' Finally,
shortening migration times from over a month to a day or two, subyearlings
reach the ocean too small for long term survival.' Consequently, the
transportation program, which is "unnecessary" in some years, further
contributes to diminishing the genetic variability of salmon stocks.
296. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 57.
297. See e.g., PHILLIP R. MUNDY ET AL., TRANSPORTATION OF JUVENILE SALMONIDS FRO
M HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN: AN INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEW,
FINAL REPORT (1994).
298. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 328.
299. See id
300. See id
301. See id at 329.
302. See id at 62.
303. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-26; INTERIM STATUS REPORT, supra
note 277, at 4-7.
304. See SPIRrr OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-26; MIGHErro & EBEL, supra note
14, at 122.
305. see SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-26.
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Not surprisingly, recent scientific review of the transportation program
questions its overall effectiveness. As early as 1994, an independent peer
reviewed panel convened by NMFS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, state
fisheries agencies, and the Tribes, concluded that "[a]vailable evidence is not
sufficient to identify transportation as either a primary or supporting method
of choice for salmon recovery in the Snake River Basin."' The panel
noted that transportation fails to protect salmon from persistent mortalities
due to the system wide degradation of the Columbia Basin,3°7 and
contributes to salmon mortality by inflicting stress, adversely affecting
genetic variability, increasing disease, and reducing homing ability.'
Moreover, a few years later, the ISG, reported that, "Transportation benefits
are incompletely substantiated and assumptions of benefits are based on
surprisingly few complete studies."' However, the federal government's
continuing investment in the transportation program further diminishing
chances for salmon recovery by precluding study of in-river migration
options.31
At dams without transport facilities, the Army Corps attempts to avoid
passing salmon through the turbines by spilling large numbers of fish over
the dams.31' In controlled spills, that do not produce gas supersaturation,
mortalities can be as low as 0% to 2% plus downstream predation.3"
However, if a forced spill occurs, as they often do when the hydropower
system is being operated for other goals, 13 gas supersaturation levels
preclude using spills as a mitigation measure. Because the water from one
dam spills into the stagnant reservoir of the next dam, gas supersaturation
quickly limits the use of spills."4 Thus, spill might be more effective at
individual dams if free-flowing conditions are restored downstream by
removing some dams. Nevertheless, while spills may resemble a natural
waterfall, like other mitigation attempts, they do nothing to reestablish
essential habitat functions which sustain salmon during their migration down
the mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers.
306. MUNDY Er AL., supra note 297, at viii, 117-18.
307. See id at 83.
308. See id at 101-02, 108-09, 114.
309. RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 61.
310. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-27 (recommending a halt on the
transportation program to allow for complete testing of flow augmentation, spills, and/or
drawdowns).
311. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 45.
312. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 281.
313. See INTERIM STATUS REPORT, supra note 277, at 4-14.
314. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 60.
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Figure 3
Finally, through flow augmentation the Army Corps attempts to counteract
adverse reservoir conditions by increasing juvenile migration times"
Because of hydropower operations, irrigation withdrawals, and flood control,
the Basin's flow has been severely regulated, see figure 3.3"6 It is thought
that without high spring flows, juvenile salmon must expend more metabolic
resources to successfully pass through the reservoirs." Thus, through flow
augmentation, the Army Corps hopes to reduce migration times and increase
survival. However, a clear relationship between high flows and survival has
not been established."8
While adding any amount of water to the system could benefit salmon,
flow augmentation is another mitigation effort which oversimplifies salmon
requirements and migration behavior in the mainstem Columbia and Snake
Rivers."9 Historical high spring flows were accompanied by functioning
alluvial habitats that provided salmon with riparian vegetative cover, calm
water pools, and complex food webs. These habitats supported migrating
salmon as they spiraled out of the high flows to rest and feed near the
shore." Treating the mainstem rivers as simply a migration corridor, the
Army Corps simplified this habitat and eliminated supportive shoreline
functions. Consequently, without reestablishing necessary floodplain habitat,
315. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 38.
316. See SPIRrr OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-27 fig.5B.3.
317. See RETURN TO THE RIvER, supra note 221, at 52.
318. See id. at 195.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 198-200. See also discussion supra Part V.A.
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augmented flows flush juveniles through the system to the ocean.," Thus,
while migration times may be reduced, young salmon arrive at the mouth of
the Columbia under developed for long term survival in the ocean.
In addition, flow augmentation without supportive habitat also selects
against some salmon life histories. Observations of salmon behavior
demonstrate that two separate life histories occupy the mainstem rivers."
Fall chinook, spawn and rear in the mainstem, while many other species
spawn and rear in tributaries and then migrate through the mainstem.'"
Thus, flushing the rivers with additional water to increase the migration
times of some fish, may also induce early migration in younger fall chinook.
Finally, because none of these mitigation measures address the most
significant impacts of hydropower operations, habitat degradation, U.S.
mitigation policy must rely on hatchery production to provide some
semblance of a salmon population." In fact, hatchery expenditures have
always accounted for the majority of all salmon recovery spending in the
Columbia Basin." Currently, hatchery production accounts for about 80%
of the Snake River stocks and 75% of the Columbia River stocks.'2
Despite this incredible investment, hatcheries have failed in their attempt to
replace or mitigate for lost natural reproduction of salmon and contribute to
the decline of wild stocks."'
Recent research demonstrates some of the detrimental effects of hatchery
production on wild salmon. First, to obtain any surviving adults, hatchery
fish must be released in such high numbers that they pose a substantial drain
on already degraded food and habitat resources. Prior to 1850, the NPPC
estimated that the Columbia Basin supported an annual smolt abundance of
264 million juveniles.' Recently, however, annual releases of
approximately 250 million hatchery juveniles, plus 145 wild juveniles, have
resulted in a total of 395 smolts migrating and inhabiting the Columbia
Basin?"
It is also noted that artificially propagated salmon reduce the genetic
viability of wild salmon. Under normative conditions, straying between
321. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 214.
322. See id. at 197-98.
323. See id. at 198.
324. See NMFS PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 217, at V-4-4.
325. Prior to 1981, and at least until 1991, hatcheries have accounted for 40% or more of
all recover, spending in the Columbia Basin. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at
388A (citing a 1992 GAO report on distribution of expenditures for salmon restoration in the
Columbia River prior to 1981 and from 1981-1991).
326. See INTERIM STATUS REPORT, supra note 277, at 2-9.
327. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 66, 397.
328. See INTERIM STATUS REPORT, supra note 277, at 2-9 (citing NORTMwEST POWER
PLANNING COUNcIL, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON SALMON AND STEELHEAD LOSSES IN
THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (1986)).




salmon populations promotes reestablishment of diminishing populations and
reinforces the viability of the entire metapopulation 3 However, because
the majority of the remaining salmon derive from hatchery stocks, even if a
small proportion strays, they can overwhelming the genetics of wild
populations and diminish their long term survival. 3 ' To avoid these effects,
hatchery production should be limited and used on a smaller scale.3 As
the ISG commented, after 100 years of artificial propagation, "it is
instructive to note that the most productive stock in the basin is the fall
chinook population that spawns naturally in the free-flowing Hanford Reach
portion of the mainstem Columbia." '
Despite the example set by the free-flowing Hanford Reach, the Corps has
attempted to "improve" in-river passage conditions since the 1970s with
bypass facilities, extended-length bar screens, transportation, flip-lips, debris
removers, and improved turbine operations. Unfortunately, this same period
has also seen a substantial increase in annual salmon mortalities from which
populations have been unable to recover.3' Indeed, the extent of the
region's investment in technological fixes is not a sign of mitigation success,
rather it indicates how lethal the current river system is to salmon.
Unfortunately, even under the ESA, NMFS has shown little movement away
from debilitating river conditions, and ineffective mitigation measures.
C. Status Quo Management under the Endangered Species Act
In 1991, the first stock of Columbia Basin salmon was listed under the
ESA.3 Nearly a decade later, NMFS has listed a total of ten salmon stocks
under the ESA, and designated the mainstem Columbia River and all
accessible portions of the Snake Basin as critical habitat for these endangered
and threatened species." Under the ESA, NMFS is required to implement
330. See RETuRN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 66.
331. See id. at 66, 390.
332. For example, the Tribes recommend using hatcheries in specific instances to supplement
lost or declining wild stocks. Contrary to large scale hatchery production that can easily
overwhelm wild stocks, supplementation works with existing stocks to rebuild populations in their
current environment. See SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-14, 5B-16.
333. See RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 221, at 395.
334. See NMFS PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 217, at V-2-3.
335. See Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991).
336. See Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead in Washington and Oregon, 64 Fed.
Reg. 14,517 (1999) (listing mid-Columbia River steelhead); Threatened Status for Two ESUs of
Chum Salmon in Washington and Oregon, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508 (1999) (listing a Columbia River
Stock); Threatened Status for Three Chinook Salmon Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) in
Washington and Oregon, and Endangered Status for One Chinook Salmon ESU in Washington
64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (1999) (listing Lower Columbia River and Upper Columbia River Spring
stocks); Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, and California 63
Fed. Reg. 13,347 (1998) (listing a lower Columbia River stock); Listing of Several Evolutionary
Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Steelhead 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1997) (listing upper
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a program "for the conservation and survival of endangered species and
threatened species."3 As a part of these plans, NMFS has recognized that
its recovery efforts must fulfill U.S. treaty obligations to the Tribes.338 In
its preliminary statement on salmon recovery, NMFS wrote, "The Proposed
Recovery Plan will address all sources of salmon mortality and will include
measures to rebuild the stocks so as to meet both the requirements of the
ESA and the federal government's treaty obligations and trust responsibilities
to the Indian people, . . ."" Nevertheless, after nearly a decade of
management under the ESA, NMFS has not implemented any changes to
overcome the miserable river conditions created by the dams. To comply
with its 1855 treaty obligations, and the ESA, NMFS must stop preserving
the status quo and begin reducing U.S. development in the Columbia Basin.
Under section 7 of the ESA, federal agencies proposing actions that may
jeopardize a listed species, i.e. the FCRPS, must consult with the relevant
fish and wildlife agency, in this case NMFS, to insure that their actions are
"not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species.... ."' As a result of this consultation, NMFS must
issue a Biological Opinion (BiOp) describing whether federal actions will
jeopardize a listed species and alternative actions that must be taken to avoid
any potential jeopardy." However, the BiOp's issued by NMFS have
endorsed the United States' failed mitigation policy and have not required
any significant changes to the current system.u
In 1992, NMFS issued its first BiOp for the FCRPS and concluded that
the operation of the dams would not jeopardize the species listed under the
ESA. 3 NMFS's "no jeopardy" decision was primarily based on a last
Columbia and Snake River stocks); Designated Critical Habitat; Snake River Sockeye Salmon,
Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook, and Snake River Fall Chinook, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,543
(1993); Theatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status
for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992); Endangered Status for Snake
River Sockeye, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991).
337. Endangered Species Act § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0 (1998).
338. See NMFS PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 217, at 1-12; 1995 BIOP, supra note
215, at 2.
339. 1995 BOP, supra note 215, at 2.
340. Endangered Species Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
341. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
342. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously:
The Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dans, Lowering
John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1002 (1998)
[hereinafter Biological, Economic, and Legal Case].
343. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT - SECTION 7
CONSULTAMON/ CONFERENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION: 1992 OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL




minute change to the NPPC's Fish and Wildlife Program." At the end of
1991, the NPPC responded to the listing of Snake River sockeye salmon on
the ESA by deceptively promising to increase Snake River flows for the first
time since the NPPC's Fish and Wildlife Program was created under the
NPA in 1982.3" However, the promised water only made it more likely
that the Snake River would meet its original water budget, leading one
scholar to comment, "In other words, according to NMFS, implementation
of the Northwest Power Act [in 1982] satisfied the ESA."' Moreover,
because the "improved" flows were still far from biologically based flows,
the 1992 BiOp endorsed the Army Corps' continued reliance on barging and
trucking.' "
In 1993 when NMFS issued another "no jeopardy" decision based on the
same conclusions, the federal District Court in Oregon struck down the 1993
BiOp as "arbitrary and capricious."'" Expressing a surprising level of
frustration with the agency's decision making process, the court stated that,
[T]he process is seriously, "significantly," flawed because it is
too heavily geared towards a status quo that has allowed all
forms of river activity to proceed in a deficit situation - that is,
relatively small steps, minor improvements and adjustments -
when the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul.
Instead of looking for what can be done to protect the species
from jeopardy, NMFS and the action agencies have narrowly
focused their attention on what the establishment is capable of
handling with minimal disruption.' "
Consequently, the district court directed NMFS to re-initiate its section 7
consultation and produce a BiOp consistent with the ESA3 0
After four years and a stem rebuke from the federal district court, NMFS
finally determined that operation of the FCRPS would jeopardize salmon
stocks."' However, despite its "jeopardy" decision, NMFS's resulting 1995
BiOp currently governing the FCRPS continues to rely on unproven
mitigation measures and only proposes to study improving in-river conditions
through reservoir drawdowns.s Attempting to "spread the risk,"3' the
344. See Amphibious Salmon, supra note 295, at 664.
345. See id. at 663-64. See also discussion supra Parts III.C.
346. Amphibious Salmon, supra note 295, at 664.
347. See Saving Idaho's Salmon, supra note 93, at 693.
348. See Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886,
900 (D. Or. 1994).
349. Id.
350. See id, at 900-01.
351. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 90-91.
352. See id. at 50, 54,94-128; see also Beyond the Parity Promise, supra note 130, at 62-76
(discussing implementation of the 1995 Biological Opinion).
353. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 112, 131; see also Beyond the Parity Promise, supra
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1995 BiOp attempts to increase river flows and spills for migrating juveniles,
while also continuing to transport most of the collected juvenile fish around
the dams."' Yet, as with earlier attempts to increase river flows, actual
implementation fell far short of the promised increases. 5' Because river
flows remain unimproved and rarely allow spilling the fish over the dams,
federal agencies continue to rely heavily on transportation to pass migrating
juveniles."6
As a further indication of the dismal state of river operations, the 1995
BiOp also authorizes dam-related mortality of up to 86% for juvenile
sockeye and spring/summer chinook and up to 100% of juvenile fall
chinook 5  However, when brought before the same Judge who had called
for a "major overhaul" in 1994, Justice Marsh was unable to prevent
continued implementation of the 1995 BiOp"5 Finding that the ESA did
not impose risk tolerance limits, and noting that principles of judicial review
required his deference to agency technical expertise, Justice Marsh could
only criticize the program for incorporating questionably high levels of
risk.3 9
Finally, apparently recognizing the inadequacy of current operations and
the "improvements" suggested by its 1995 BiOp, NMFS stated, "Without
major modifications to the Snake and Columbia River dams, it is unlikely
survivals can be sufficiently improved to ensure that the operation of the
[FCRPS] does not impede the survival and recovery of listed Snake River
salmon.S" However, rather than beginning to implement any "major
modifications," the 1995 BiOp merely proposes to study structural changes
such as spillway crest drawdown, natural river drawdown, or surface
collectors. 63 Thus, the only "reasonable and prudent alternative" actually
implemented by the 1995 BiOp to prevent the FCRPS from jeopardizing the
note 130, at 63.
354. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 91-104, 110-12.
355. See Beyond the Parity Promise, supra note 130, at 84-98.
356. See id. at 94-95.
357. See 1995 BiO', supra note 215, at 159. Page 159 appears to contain a typographical
error. Th , 1995 BiOp was for three listed species: Snake River sockeye salmon, Snake River
springsuimnmer chinook salmon, and Snake River fall chinook salmon. However, in listing
incidental take limits for these three species, the BiOp lists Snake River spring/summer chinook
twice. Following the order of the rest of the BiOp, the third species on the list should probably
read "Snake River fall chinook.
358. See American Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 96-384-MA, slip op. at 26
(D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997).
359. See id.
360. See 1995 BiOp, supra note 215, at 81.
361. Id. Similar modifications were suggested by the Tribes and state fishery agencies, but
NMFS rejected them as inconsistent with the basic assumptions of the juvenile passage model
used by the NMFS to support most of its 1995 Biological Opinion. See generally 1995 BIOP,
supra nole 215, at 84-85, 111.
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listed species is the study of future modifications to the dams. While
studying the alternatives will delay salmon recovery almost ten years since
invocation of the ESA, the resulting studies finally confirm that dam removal
is the only option capable of resorting salmon populations.
D. Returning Salmon to the River through Dam Removal
To prevent the extirpation of remaining salmon runs, and to rebuild self-
sustaining populations NMFS must implement a recovery plan that reduces
U.S. development of the Columbia Basin. Since 1993, at least thirteen
studies of the biological, technical, and economic issues have concluded that
salmon recovery requires halting the current transportation based program
and restoring free-flowing rivers through reservoir drawdowns or dam
removal?' Five of these studies are comprehensive scientific assessments
written by or for the primary bodies governing Columbia Basin salmon and
hydropower: the Tribes, the NPPC, the Army Corps, the State of Idaho, and
NMFS.' Eliminating the last remaining scientific support for the current
362. See COLUMBIA BASIN INDIAN TRIBES AND STATE & FEDERAL FISH & WILDLIFE
AGENCIES, DErAILED FISH OPERATING PLAN WITH 1994 OPERATING CRITERIA 2-23 (1993)
(recommending seasonal drawdowns and use of transportation only as a last resort); MUNDY Er
AL, supra note 297, at 116 (concluding that transportation could not prevent the decline and
extirpation of listed salmon species); NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER
BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5-46 (1994) (suggesting seasonal drawdowns and warning
that transportation should not be regarded as a substitute to restoring the river ecosystem);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
4, 241 (1995) (giving only qualified endorsement of transportation and recommending long term
reliance on natural river functions); SPIRIT OF TIE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-24 to 5B-31
(recommending permanent drawdowns and halting transportation); RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra
note 221, at xx, 5, 506, 509 (criticizing transportation and supporting restoration of normative
river conditions); HARZA REPORT, supra note 279, at 1-9 (concluding that dam removals are the
best choice biologically and economically); IDAHO DEPIr OF FISH & GAME, REPORT TO THE
DIRECTOR, IDAHO'S ANADROMOUS FISH STOCKS: THEIR STATUS AND RECOVERY OPTIoNs 8-11
(1998) (supporting dam removal and concluding that transportation could not meet recovery
standards) [hereinafter IDAHO'S ANADROMOUS FISH STOCKS]; PHILIP S. LANSING & EVE VOGEL,
RESTORING THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER: SAVING THE SNAKE RIVER SALMON AND SAVING MONEY
4 (n.d.) (concluding that the net economic benefits of the lower Snake River dams are less than
their total operation and maintenance costs including salmon mitigation); EBAN GOODSTEIN, DAM
ECONOMICS: OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER C-17 to C-18 (1998)
(finding the economic costs and benefits of removing the four lower Snake River dams to be
roughly equal, but noting that the "existence value" of salmon clearly overwhelmed the additional
electricity); NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMINISTRATION'S POTENTIAL FUTURE COSTS AND REVENUES 6-8 (1998) (stating that the
primary economic variable was electricity costs, not any particular recovery option); PLAN FOR
ANALYZING AND TESTING HYPOTHESES (PATH), PATH FINAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998,
at 24 (D.R. Marmorek et al. eds., 1998) (concluding that natural river drawdowns give all salmon
stocks the best chance of recovery) [hereinafter PATH FINAL REPORT]. For a summary of these
reports and others, see Biologica Economic, and Legal Case. supra note 342, at 1012-31.
363. See SPIrr OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at 5B-24 to 5B-31; RETURN TO THE RIVER,
supra note 221, at xx, 5, 506, 509; HARZA REPORT, supra note 279, at 1-9 (1996); IDAHO'S
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mitigation program, the report prepared for NMFS refutes the technical
modeling results NMFS relied on for its 1995 BiOp.'
The first of these five reports was the Tribes' 1995 salmon restoration
plan, Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit (Spirit of the Salmon), which forged the
path that is now followed by most state and federal agencies governing
hydropower operations. The Tribes broke the cycle of endless mitigation by
prioritizing "respect and reverence" for the salmon who "unselfishly gave of
itself for the physical and spiritual sustenance of humans."' Contrary to
the United States' mitigation policy, the tribal plan takes a "gravel-to-gravel"
approach encompassing the entire salmon life cycle." This approach shifts
the focus of recovery efforts away from technological fixes toward providing
salmon habitat and ecological functions supportive of salmon populations.
The Tribes' recommendations included permanent drawdowns, habitat
restoration, and careful supplementation of salmon populations. 7 Like the
recovery plans that would follow, the Tribes recommended permanent
drawdowns of the Snake River reservoirs through dam removal and some
drawdown of John Day reservoir.' The Tribes support permanent dam
removals, as opposed to seasonal drawdowns, because permanent drawdowns
would allow for reestablishment of shoreline vegetation, and would restore
substantial spawning areas for threatened salmon stocks.' Restoring these
and other habitat functions, which are essential to self-sustaining salmon
populations, is an underlying foundation of the Tribal recovery plan. 7 In
addition, recognizing that hatchery propagation has become indispensable for
maintaining salmon populations, the Tribes advocated refining the program
to reduce some of its inherent risks Instead of mass rearing hatchery
bred fish or captive breeding, the Tribes would carefully reintroduce or
supplement lost and diminishing stocks, utilizing the as much of each stock's
ANADROMOUS FISH STocKs, supra note 362, at 8-11; PATH FINAL REPORT, supra note 362, at
24.
364. See PATH FINAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 24 (examining all fish passage models
and uncertainties and concluding that natural river drawdown produces higher biological benefits
regardle-s of the model used); 1995 BiOp, supra note 215, at 84-85 (discussing the respective
assumptions of the passage models and relying on the model which tends to produce results
shows that transporting the salmon in barges and trucks produces the highest rates of survival).
365. SPIRIT OF THE SALMON, supra note 2, at ii.
366. See id. at iv.
367. See id at x.
368. See id at 5B-30.
369. See id.
370. Conversely, U.S. mitigation policies have devoted few resources to habitat restoration
or protection. See RETURN TO THE RIvER, supra note 221, at 388A (calculating that less than 1%
of total recovery expenditures were allocated to habitat restoration prior to 1981, and only 7%
was allocated from 1981 to 1991).




natural environment as possible?' Finally, the Tribes call for an end to the
failed transportation program, so that restoration agencies can begin "putting
the fish back in the river. '
Next, in 1996, two reports prepared for the federal bodies primarily
responsible for salmon conservation and hydropower operations affirmed
dam removal as the most biologically and economically responsible recovery
method. One study was prepared for the NPPC, the federal body originally
charged with overseeing salmon conservation under the NPA.374 This report
was written by the ISG, an independent and peer reviewed team of scientists
contracted by the NPPC. The group was asked to develop a scientifically
based conceptual foundation to guide further recovery efforts and to conduct
a comprehensive review of the science underlying the NPPC's Fish and
Wildlife Program.375 First, determining that the reestablishment of
"normative ecosystem conditions" should be the foundation for any
successful recovery measures, the ISG criticized the NPPC for adopting the
flawed "machine metaphor" to guide its conservation program."' This
view, dominating Pacific Northwest fisheries management and salmon
recovery for over a century, perpetuates economic extraction of natural
resources through the belief that a technological system can be engineered
to sustain salmon populations in isolation from the degraded ecosystem.'m
In contrast, the ISG "recommended that the region move from a strategy of
'fixing' ecosystem damage to one that places greater reliance on re-expression
of the natural biological and physical processes of the Columbia River
salmon-bearing ecosystem."'3
Thus, the ISG noted, "The key to salmon productively in the future will
be the degree to which normative ecosystem conditions are re-introduced into
the Columbia River Basin."'r "For example," they elaborated, "an approach
whose goal is a normative ecosystem would highlight restoration of life
history diversity, rather than more technological approaches, such as
transporting fish in barges or producing them in hatcheries. 3 o
Consequently, similar to the Tribes' plan, the ISG supported drawdowns of
the lower Snake River and either John Day or McNary reservoirs to
reestablish free-flowing conditions. The ISG concluded that such action
372. See id. at 5B-14 to 5B-24.
373. Id. at x, 5B-27
374. See discussion of the NPA supra Part III.C.
375. See RETuRN TO TE RIvER, supra note 221, at xiv.
376. Id. at 506-08.
377. See idU at 507.
378. Id. at xxiii.
379. Id. at xxiv.
380. Id. at xxv.
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would result in salmon productivity similar to the Hanford Reach which
supports one of the last self-sustaining salmon stocks s'
The other report released in 1996 was prepared by HARZA Northwest for
the Army Corps who operates the FCRPS. The Army Corps asked that
HARZA assess the biologic and economic feasibility of salmon recovery
options w First, HARZA unequivocally supported the biological
conclusions of the previous two studies. HARZA stated,
Quite simply, dam removal is the biological option of choice if
salmon and ecosystem restoration is the primary goal. Removal
of four Snake River dams will increase salmon survival by about
72 percent above existing in-river levels. Dam removal plus
improvements to lower Columbia River dams included would
about double annual salmon population production.'
Moreover, if return rates for Columbia Basin salmon continue at their present
rate, less than 1%, HARZA concluded, "[I]t will not be possible to recover
Snake River salmon using transportation or with the dams in place. Only
dam removal will provide sufficient benefits to have any chance for
reversing decline.""3
Second, HARZA's economic assessment further supported dam removals.
Based on the mitigation measures authorized by NMFS's 1995 BiOp, the cost
of transporting, spilling and flow augmentation was estimated at $200
million.w In contrast, depending on when dam removal is initiated,
HARZ& estimated that removing the four lower Snake River dams would
cost between $75 and $153 million.' To achieve the lower of these costs,
NMFS would have until the year 2010 to implement dam removal, more than
a decade from its original 1999 decision date when the Final Recovery Plan
was originally slated for release.
Thus, as early as 1996, the federal agencies primarily responsible for
hydropower operations and salmon conservation in the Columbia Basin, had
been directly advised that dam removal, not mitigation, would recover
salmon populations. Moreover, the Tribes, to whom the federal government
must defer with regard to salmon conservation,'" had previously submitted
their comprehensive plan incorporating dam removal. In 1998, the state of
Idaho with potentially the most invested in maintaining the lower Snake
River dams, and in removing them, also came out in favor of dam removals.
381. See id. at 268.
382. See HARZA REPORT, supra note 279, at 1-1.
383. Il at 1-16 (emphasis removed).
384. l. at 1-17.
385. See id. at 1-14.
386. See id. at 1-14, 1-18.
387. See Northwest Power Act, § 839b(h)(5) (1998); see also discussion supra Part III.C.
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Idaho is home to many of the salmon species currently listed on the ESA,
and is also one of the few beneficiaries of the lower Snake River Dams."'
In the face of these disparate influences, the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game supported dam removals as "the best biological choice" among the
options being considered for the 1999 decision date.'
Relying entirely on feasibility and biological criteria, Idaho judged
recovery options based on their ability to sustain a 2%-6% smolt-to-adult
survival rate."9 Noting that there "is no scientific basis" for assuming the
current transportation program can meet these survival standards, Idaho
considered the possibility of an enhanced transportation program verses
permanent drawdowns of the lower Snake River.39 However, because
transportation enhancements remain untested, and questionable flow
augmentation would still be required, Idaho could find no scientific support
for continuing or improving the mitigation program.3" On the other hand,
the state determined that natural river drawdown "has a strong scientific
basis" and would remove the "primary factor" limiting salmon recovery. 3
Finally, in the development of its Final Recovery Plan, NMFS is
attempting to eliminate or refine remaining uncertainties regarding whether
dam removals or a mitigation program based on transportation is the best
option to recover endangered salmon. These uncertainties are being
considered through a peer reviewed interagency working group of twenty-
five scientists created by NMFS's 1995 BiOp.39' Specifically, the Plan for
Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses (PATH) is charged with the ominous task
of examining all the existing evidence as it identifies, addresses, and reduces
uncertainties in the fundamental biological issues surrounding recovery of
endangered Columbia Basin salmon stocks to self-sustaining levels.3' After
its exhaustive study, in late 1999, PATH was contracted to advise NMFS in
its development of a Final Recovery Plan for endangered Columbia Basin
salmon.
388. The lower Snake River dams allow Lewiston, Idaho, 471 miles from the ocean, to be
an inland seaport. This navigational channel provides some of the most subsidized transportation
in the country. See Biological Economic, and Legal Case, supra note 342, at 125. Moreover,
the lower Snake River dams were originally conceived as post-World War II make-work projects
whose economic costs outweighed any economic benefits. See PETERSEN, supra note 94, at 119-
25. Approximately, 30 years later, the Snake River dams provide no flood control, less than 5%
of the region's hydropower, subsidized irrigation for 13 corporate farms, and dubious navigation
benefits. See Biological, Economic, and Legal Case, supra note 342, at 125.
389. IDAHO'S ANADROMOUS FISH STOCKS, supra note 362, at 16.
390. See id at 6. This is the same standard used by NMFS and represents stock productivity
observed in the 1950s and 1960s prior to completion of the lower Snake River dams.
391. See id at 13-15.
392. See id. at 13-14.
393. See id at 14-15.
394. See 1995 B10P, supra note 215, at 6.
395. See PATH FINAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 1.
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The PATH study utilizes an intensive four-step modeling process to assess
the potential outcomes of seven management options with regard to the listed
species." The benefits and limits of the management options are explored
by incorporating species specific uncertainties into each model run."'
These uncertainties are variable, expressed by a range of alternative
hypotheses that describe unknown effects of management actions on fish
populations." For example, for spring/summer and fall chinook, PATH
identified fourteen uncertainties each with an individual set of alternative
hypotheses.' Then, for each salmon species and management option,
hundreds and thousands of possible outcomes are produced by running the
four-step model with different expressions of the fourteen uncertainties.
Finally, each model outcome, based on one expression of the uncertainties,
is tabulated as part of a cumulative frequency distribution of all the outcomes
for a particular species and a management option" Plotted against
NMFS's survival and recovery standards,' the results show the number of
times that a particular management option does or does not recover the listed
species.0 3 Converted to percentages, these results show the probability, in
396. See id at 3. The recovery options explored derive from recommendations in NMFS's
1995 BiOp. Thus far, seven options are being considered: actions authorized under the 1995
BiOp, 1995 BiOp actions plus transportation of all collected fish, 1995 BiOp actions plus
transportation of all fish collected with improved fish guidance screens, natural river drawdown
of the four lower Snake River reservoirs, two in-river flow augmentation options, and natural
river drawdown of the four lower Snake River reservoirs plus John Day reservoir. See id. at 18-
20. For each recovery plan, PATH first uses a hydro-regulation model to predict how the plan
would influence Columbia and Snake River flows. These results are then plugged into two
differing passage models which predict salmon survival for transported and non-transported
smolts. Next, the smolt survivals predicted by the passage models are combined with historic
survival data to produce a survival ratio which more fully refines the variability in survival rates
and the factors which affect them. Finally, this information is used to produce spawner abundance
number; generated by two different life-cycle models. See id. at 19.
397. See PATH FINAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 4.
398. See id at 22-26.
399. See PATH FINAL REPORT, supra note 362, at 22-24. Uncertainties considered were:
in-river survival assumptions, fish guidance efficiency, turbine/bypass mortality, predator removal
effectiveness, duration of pre-dam removal period, long term juvenile survival after drawdown,
duration from dam removal until physical and biological equilibrium is reached, transportation
assumptions, life-cycle model, mortality occurring outside the migration period/future climate,
habitat effects, harvest schedules, additional sources of mortality, adult survival in John Day
reservoir after drawdown. See id.
400. See id. at 26-28. For example, for spring/summer chinook PATH produced 2160
possible outcomes for four of the recovery options. See id. at 28 & n.5.
401. See id at 28-29.
402. NMFS survival standards are figured at 24 years, short term, and 100 years, long term.
Recovey standards are calculated over 48 years. See id. at 5-7.




light of all the uncertainties, that a particular management option will
promote the survival or recovery of a particular species.
In its preliminary report, PATH directly addressed the most politically and
economically charged "uncertainty" created by the two different passage
models used to predict juvenile survival during migration.' One model,
the Columbia River Fish Passage model (CRiSP), was developed by the
Bonneville Power Administration with assistance from the University of
Washington. Not surprisingly, the CRiSP model tends to produce results
showing a high level of juvenile survival through transportation with the
dams in place.' Contributing significantly to preservation of the status
quo, this model was relied on extensively in NMFS's 1995 BiOp. In
contrast, the passage model developed by the region's fishery agencies and
the Tribes, Fish Leaving Under Several Hypotheses (FLUSH), produces
results favoring in-river migration options.' The 1995 BiOp rejected
management options suggested by this model.
Thus, to evaluate the accuracy and appropriateness of the two passage
models, PATH ran each management option through both models hundreds
and thousands of times incorporating different configurations of the other
significant uncertainties.4 " PATH's results demonstrated that despite their
respective biases, natural river drawdown was the most promising recovery
method regardless of which passage model was used.4 " For example, over
the short term, the most difficult time period for all the recovery plans, dam
removal improved salmon recovery over transportation by 15 to 25%
regardless of the model used."' Further, over the long term, both models
demonstrated that dam removal provided nearly a 100% chance of
recovery.4 3 Significantly, these results confirm the general assumptions
built into the FLUSH model, but rejected by NMFS's 1995 BiOp, i.e., that
in-river migration provides the most promising survival rates.
Next, these preliminary results underwent a challenging peer review by
four PATH scientists chosen for their expertise and lack of connection to
Columbia Basin agencies.4 4 First, addressing the appropriateness of the
404. See iU. at 9 tbl.l.3.5-1.
405. For a summary of the components of a passage model, see id at 19.
406. The Bonneville Power Administration is a federal entity responsible for marketing the
hydropower produced by the dams. See 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1994).
407. See Memorandum from PATH Planning Group to Implementation Team, Corrections
to the PATH Preliminary Report vi-ix (Aug. 4, 1998) (on file with author).
408. See 1995 BIOP, supra note 215, at 84-85, 111.
409. See id
410. See Memorandum from PATH Planning Group to Implementation Team, Corrections
to the PATH Preliminary Report vi (Aug. 4, 1998) (on file with author).
411. See iL at ix.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. PATH Scientific Review Panel, Conclusions and Recommendations from the PATH
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passage models, the reviewers supported the accuracy and appropriateness
of the FLUSH model over the CRiSP model relied on by NMFS. Criticizing
the CRISP model they stated that it was "too complex," "overly
parameterized," "overly optimistic," required more data manipulation, and
contained assumptions which were "not credible."4"' In contrast, the
reviewers generally praised the FLUSH model for its simplicity, strong ties
to field work and empirical data, "significantly stronger" underlying rational,
foundation in "empirical relationships," and ability to explain historic
declines without additional unexplained theories 6
The four reviewers then performed a "sensitivity analysis" to review the
accuracy of PATH's preliminary results. The reviewing scientists focused on
seven significant uncertainties, including passage mortality whose range of
hypotheses is expressed by the two different passage models. Looking at the
range of hypothetical outcomes for each uncertainty, the individual scientists
weight-d each hypothesis based on its credibility.!7 Then, using their
individual weighting schemes, the reviewers tested each management option
in light of their weighted uncertainties.4 " These weighted results confirmed
that natural river drawdown through dam removal was the most promising
recovery method.419 Under the different weighting schemes the two
transportation options only met NMFS's survival standards on one occasion
over the short term.4" However, the two dam removal options, met or
surpassed NMFS's survival standard on five occasions over the short
term."' Applying the results to NMFS's recovery standard showed the most
difference between the management options42 For all weighting schemes,
dam removal approximately doubled the chances for salmon recovery over
transportation!"
Findly, the most recent PATH report, Final Report for Fiscal Year 1998,
continues to confirm the earlier results. Reviewing a total of seven recovery
options for multiple species across a broad range of uncertainties, PATH
concluded that the natural river options produced the most robust responses
from the models. They determined, "For all species, [the natural river
options] produce higher biological benefits than the other actions .... ""
Combining results for NMFS's survival and recovery standards, natural river
Weight of the Evidence Workshop 2 (Sept. 8-10, 1998) (unpublished report on file with author).
415. See U at 10-11.
416. See id.
417. See id. at 9.
418. See h.L at 17.
419. See id
420. See id. at 17-18.
421. See id
422. See id. at 18-19.
423. See id.




drawdown gave fall chinook a 100% chance of recovery, and a 47 to 65%
chance of recovery for spring/summer chinook.41 Meanwhile, maximizing
transportation, with the yet undeveloped surface bypass collection system,
produced only a 23% to 37% chance of recovery for these spcies.'
These recent results confirm what nearly every study on salmon recovery
has concluded since the ESA was invoked in 1991. To rebuild self-sustaining
salmon stocks, it has long been recommended that, "the region move from
a strategy of 'fixing' ecosystem damage to one that places greater reliance on
re-expression of the natural biological and physical processes of the
Columbia River salmon-bearing ecosystem."' Moreover, in light of the
United States' treaty obligations the Columbia Basin Tribes, it is not enough
to continue using transportation and mitigation as a band-aid that supports
a few unharvestable salmon. Rather, the 1855 treaties, and the ESA, require
that saion populations be returned to harvestable and sustainable levels. To
accomplish this mandated recovery, the best available science concludes that
the U.S. must reduce its development of the Columbia Basin.
VI. Conclusion
Based on this overwhelming evidence, the U.S. should end its mitigation
policy and recover the salmon resources reserved by the Columbia Basin
Tribes. Since time immemorial, the Columbia Basin Tribes have derived
their daily sustenance and economic livelihood from the salmon that return
to the basin each year. The 1855 treaties between the U.S. and the Columbia
Basin Tribes, reserved and protected these salmon harvests at economically
viable levels. In addition to ensuring a 50% tribal share of salmon harvests,
the treaties also impose a development servitude against the U.S. and its
citizens. Thus, the U.S. may not develop the Columbia Basin in a way that
threatens the economic viability of the Tribes' harvests. To restore viable
salmon habitat and promote self-sustaining salmon populations the U.S. must
diminish its development of the Columbia Basin. Since 1993, nearly every
major salmon recovery plan and study of the FCRPS operations reject
current mitigation measures and conclude that dam removal is the only
option that will restore habitat functions necessary for salmon survival and
recovery.
The two outcomes suggested by this article are not impossibilities. First,
the Columbia Basin treaties can be used to reduce or prevent development
if that development violates provisions of the agreement. For example, in
Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander,42 the
425. See id at 9.
426. See id
427. RE7URN TO Tim RIVER, supra note 221, at xxiii, 51.
428. 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977).
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court enjoined developing a dam on Cathrine Creek because the dam would
"erode" the tribes fishing rights secured by treaty.4' The treaties between
the U.S. and Indian Nations are binding agreements whose provisions must
be fulfilled under the law. The requirements of these formal written
relationships cannot be ignored simply because they are inconvenient to
current development schemes.
Even in the Columbia Basin, where one of the United States' largest
watersheds is operated as though it were plumbing, the law supports
restoring the Tribes' treaty fisheries to economically harvestable levels. As
recovery plans are developed under the ESA, policy makers need to be
reinformed of their treaty obligations to the Columbia Basin Tribes.
Congressional legislation and U.S. Supreme Court case law all require that
U.S. development limit its impact on the Tribes' treaty reserved fisheries!" °
Second, despite the awesome grip that dams and related development have
on the collective American conscious, scientific reports, engineering reports,
and economic assessments demonstrate that some Columbia and Snake River
dams can be removed without devastating consequences 3' In this time of
economic prosperity, it would be worthwhile to consider our economic
choices and promote economies that are sustainable in the long term. While
the resource extraction promoted by the dams requires ever-increasing
technological investment to sustain itself, the natural processes of a free-
flowing river can sustain the valuable salmon resources.
Although the politicians are beginning to raise their own barriers, the
science, ecology, and success of dam removal are quite easy to see.
Moreover, removing the dams will promote self-sustaining salmon popula-
tions. For example, Redfish Lake, nine hundred miles east and 6,500 feet up,
from the Pacific Ocean was once home to thousands of Snake River sockeye
salmon." However, in 1910 the Golden Sunbeam Mining Company
constructed a dam across the Salmon River blocking access to Redfish Lake
and eliminating the stock by 1927!"3 Then, in 1931, local fishermen blew
429. See id. at 555; Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1515-16 (W.D.
Wash. 1988) (preventing construction of a marina on a usual and accustomed fish site).
430. In addition, it appears that the Tribes could file an environmental justice complaint with
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as hydropower development disproportionally impacts
the tribal economies compared the surrounding industrial economies. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120
(1999). These regulations implement a recent Executive Order requiring that federal actions
address environmental justice issues. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
431. For an assessment of the economic benefits of dam removal, see HARZA REPORT,
supra note 279, at 1-10 to 1-14 (concluding that annual costs for mitigation program authorized
by NMFS's 1995 BiOp are $200 million, while annual costs for a four dar permanent drawdown
are between $75 and $153 million depending on whether drawdown began in 2010 or later). See
also Susan Whately & Rocky Barker, Breaching: A Natural River Saves Fish and Money, IDAHO
STATESMAN, July 20, 1997, at 12A.
432. See PETERSEN, supra note 94, at 193.
433. See id. at 195; Susan Whately & Rocky Barker, Breaching: 1990s Solution for a 1960s
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss2/4
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up the dam restoring access to the lake' Within ten years of the dam
removal, 200 sockeye salmon had returned, and in 1955 the population had
climbed to 4,361 sockeye salmon 35 Unfortunately, after 1955 construction
of the four lower Snake River dams eliminated so many miles of alluvial
salmon habitat, that Redfish Lake populations again declined.4 Recently,
depending on the year, there have been seven sockeye salmon spawning in
Redfish Lake, and sometimes there are none.
The rise and fall of the Redfish Lake stock demonstrates that the dams are
the principle factor limiting salmon populations in the Columbia and Snake
Rivers. Even years after their construction, removing the dams will allow
salmon populations to return to self-sustaining levels. Contrary to mitigation
efforts, dam removal will restore the ecological functions that sustain salmon
populations. Under the agreement reached in 1855 between the U.S. and the
Columbia Basin Tribes, these functions must be restored to recover the
Tribes' fisheries to economically viable levels.
Problem, IDAHO STATESMAN, July 21, 1997, at 8A-9A.
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